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Since the inception of federal radio and television regulation,'
efforts to achieve local service and to resolve associated problems have
1. The Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, §§ 1-41, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (current version at
Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976)). Local license
distribution was provided for by § 9 of the Act (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 307
(1976)). The Radio Act of 1927 provisions were made much more explicit by the Davis
Amendment of 1928, Pub. L. No. 195, 45 Stat. 373. It divided the United States into
five zones and required equal division of facilities among the zones. Within the zones,
equitable division of broadcast facilities was required among the states based on population. The terms of the Davis Amendment, particularly the authority to revoke licenses to
achieve the equality required by the amendment, were upheld by the Supreme Court in
Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 282

(1933).
In Nelson the Commission modified the license of Gary, Indiana, station WJKS to
permit it unlimited time operation on 560 kc, a frequency previously occupied by two
Chicago stations. Id. at 269. The Commission found that Illinois had an excess for a
state within the zone, while Indiana had less than its proportion; that WJKS rendered an
outstanding service aimed at the polyglot population of the Gary-Calumet region; and
that the deletion of the two Chicago stations would provide better service and satisfy the
public interest criteria. Id. at 270-73.
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been central to regulatory policy. Federal regulation of radio and television programming, although halfheartedly applied, has attempted to
provide local service to the geographic areas of broadcaster assignment
and the population thereof.2 Thus, radio and television licenses have
been allocated on a geographic basis to serve the programming needs of
local areas. 3 Regardless of the significance of the local service effort, it
has seldom been the focus of legal commentary. 4 Similarly, the local service emphasis has been largely unquestioned by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and those who are affected by or study
the FCC's work. 5 It is therefore not surprising that the reasons for the
local service effort and the definition of what constitutes the local service
obligation are unclear, and consideration of the consequences of the
FCC's reliance on the local service concept is minimal. 6 Yet, in the face
of, and perhaps because of, this lack of examination, emphasis on the
local service obligation remains at the core of broadcast regulation.
Local service has been advanced as a basic concept in every major
legislative effort to modify the Federal Communications Act, 7 including
the most recent legislative attempt to revise the regulation of television
broadcasting and to totally deregulate radio broadcasting.8 The result of
2. See Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 20
Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1901 (1960). The Policy statement is an interim report that has been
consistently relied on by the FCC. See, e.g., Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d 418, 441 (1976), discussed in notes 126-29, 153-63
infra and accompanying text; Suburban Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C. 1021 (1961), affd sub
nom. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962),
discussed in notes 183-204 infra and accompanying text.
3. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.24 (1978) (AM radio); id. § 73.202 (FM radio); id. § 73.606
(television), discussed in notes 130-50 infra and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 99-108 (1973) (discussing problem from economic view); Barrow, The
Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 VA. L. REV. 633, 640 (1966)
(discussing local service only as subordinate part of programming problems); Jaffe, The
Fairness Doctrine, Equal Time, Reply to Personal Attacks, and the Local Service
Obligation:Implications of TechnologicalChange, 37 U. CINN. L. REV. 550, 556 (1968)
(less than page given to problem).
The most extensive treatment of the specific problem of attaining program standards
is contrary to the routine mass statewide license renewals. See Broadcasting in America
and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1
(1968).
5. See generally Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process:
An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1 (1968) (example of criticism of this approach).
6. See Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1183,
1191-98 (1973).
7. S. 624, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), discussed in notes 503-44 infra and accompanying text; S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). While there had been amendments to the Communications Act, no major revision was attempted until 1974, following WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969), discussed
in note 464 infra and following text.
8. See H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Reading various media reports
leads to a view that it is likely to be a highly controversial legislative effort that may well
make no progress, because it is sweeping and drastic in its changes. This Article deals
primarily with the local service aspects of the bill.
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this continued unexamined reliance on the local service concept is an
ongoing frustration with much FCC policy. Most groups that participate
in, are affected by, or are concerned with FCC policy feel this frustration. Much of this frustration flows from the inability to achieve the
goals of particular groups or to elicit an overall consistent and effective
policy from the FCC. The resulting problem is a state of inertia in which
FCC policy, both as articulated and as applied, does not satisfactorily
accommodate local service needs. This Article approaches the failure to
achieve appropriate program service by posing a mode of analysis of the
local service obligation, 9 applying that analysis to the lack of appropriate program service,' 0 and suggesting a complex combination of simple proposals to achieve the elusive solution of better establishing and
implementing elements of the local service obligation."
I.

PROGRAM CONTENT-DEFINING AND BALANCING THE
INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC AND THE BROADCASTER

The framework of analysis of the local service obligation (and most
other broadcasting policies) begins with the tensions between first
amendment guarantees and the public interest requirement of the Communications Act.12 First amendment considerations involve the rights of
the public I3 and the rights of the broadcaster, including the broadcaster's protection against censorship. 14 A third factor, the unique
business nature of the broadcast enterprise, also must be considered. 5
Extensive emphasis on any one of these factors eclipses the others; this is
particularly true of an emphasis that permits an unfettered exercise of
licensee discretion,' 6 which allows the licensee to use its unduly
9. See notes 83-105 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 129-463 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 464-592 infra and accompanying text.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976). The public interest standard is not distirict. Rather, the
standard is a combination of the other criteria set forth and the general consideration of
the public good. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 252, 267-68
(D.C. Cir. 1974); notes 19-20 infra and accompanying text.
13. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
14. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
[of] any radio station.").
15. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974):
There is, in the familiar sense, no free market in radio entertainment because
over-the-air broadcasters do not deal directly with their listeners. They derive
their revenue from the sale of advertising time. More time may be sold, and at
higher rates, by a station that has a larger or a demographically more desirable
audience for advertisers.
Id. at 268 (emphasis original).
16. It is unlikely that the public's first amendment rights will totally eclipse the
broadcaster's interest. The interest is extremely diverse. Such a diverse interest is unlikely
to totally eclipse any of its parts. In addition, the need for a financially viable broadcast
service to meet the public's first amendment rights largely protects the business interests
of licensees. Nevertheless, when the public interest is pushed to an undue extreme, the
first amendment interests of the broadcaster may be neglected. See text accompanying
notes 23-24 infra.
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emphasized first amendment right in derogation of the public's first
amendment right. "If advertisers on the whole prefer to reach an audience of a certain type . . . then broadcasters, left entirely to themselves
by the FCC, would shape their programming to the tastes of that seg'17
ment of the public.
Permitting an unlimited exercise of licensee discretion would be
inherently inconsistent with "secur[ing] the maximum benefits of radio
to all the people of the United States"18 and would not be a situation
that comports with the Communications Act as construed by the United
States Supreme Court. It is therefore essential to consider all three factors integrally and to establish a proper focus. 1 9 In addition, the collateral question of the importance and nature of the local service obligation must be considered in the particular context of balancing public
and broadcaster interests.
In considering program content, it is necessary to posit a federal
regulatory goal for broadcasting under the "public interest, convenience
and necessity" standard of the Communications Act. 20 The Supreme
Court indicated that this statutory goal must draw support from the
most basic first amendment right, that of the public. 21 In Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC22 the Supreme Court enunciated this goal in
the particular broadcast context of that case: "It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.1 23 More substantially, "[i]t is the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
,,24 Thus, under the first amendment
experiences which is crucial ....
and the Communications Act, the goal of broadcast regulation is a
broad and satisfactory access for all potential viewers to a diversity of
ideas and experiences, especially those ideas and experiences concerning
17. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
18. Id.
19. This is not an easy task. See id. at 268-69, 276-83 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
20. The Communication Act requires that the FCC issue licenses and otherwise act
47 U.S.C. § 309
consistently with "the public interest, convenience and necessity ....
(1976); see id. §§ 303, 307(a). The term "public interest, convenience, and necessity" is
not defined precisely in the Communications Act. However, the Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]his mandate is given meaning and contour by the other provisions of the
statute and the subject matter with which it deals." FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 473 (1940) (footnote omitted). The first amendment is a major source of
definition. See note 139 infra and accompanying text.
21. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 92 (1973):
[T]he "public interest" standard necessarily invites reference to First Amendment principles.
...In resolving that issue [of balance of public, broadcaster and individual
interests] it must constantly be kept in mind that the interest of the public is
our foremost concern.
Id. at 122.
22. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). For an overview of the licensee's right, see notes 29-86
infra and accompanying text.
23. 395 U.S. at 390.
24. Id.
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public affairs. 25 To achieve this purpose, the broadcaster is licensed in
26
the public interest as a public trustee.
The focus in this part is on (1) the accommodation of the first
amendment rights of the public and the broadcaster in light of the
business nature of broadcasting, 27 and (2) the achievement of the ideal
of superior local programming service while considering the first amendment rights of the broadcaster and the business nature of broadcasting.28
A.

Accommodating the Rights of the Various Interests

More than pious assertions and hopes are required to accommodate
the first amendment interests of the public and the broadcaster. The
first amendment right of the public must be juxtaposed against both the
first amendment right of the broadcaster and the nature of broadcasting
as a business, in light of three general principles enunciated by the
Supreme Court in CBS, Inc. v. DemocraticNational Committee. 29 First,
a viable broadcast system must exist in order to serve the public
interest.5 0 Second, the public interest that the FCC is mandated to vindicate exceeds the individual broadcaster interest. 3 ' Finally, the broad25. This assumes public affairs programming is more important than other programming, an idea to which the FCC currently subscribes. See note 222 infra; cf. note
86 infra (rejecting consideration of entertainment programs). This is the thrust of Red
Lion and much first amendment theory. The preeminence of public affairs programming is accepted in this Article with the caveat that entertainment programs must not
be denigrated. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 267-68 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
In other decisions, notably those extending limited first amendment protection to
advertising, the Red Lion enunciation of the public right to information has been
reiterated as a right of great value. See Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756-57, 762-65 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809, 821-22 (1975); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121, 124-27
(1973); cf. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1974)(no first amendment
forum in municipally owned transit system).
26. "It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees given the privilege of
using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obligated to give
suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern." Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).
27. See text accompanying notes 29-72 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 73-84 infra.
29. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
30. The reliance on a private broadcast system requires sensitivity to the profit
motive of the private licensee. This is the primary reason for protection of the business
interest of the licensee. Without profits, a private broadcasting system will lack the
wherewithal and the motivation to provide superior service, however defined. The profit
motive can also be used as an incentive to ensure compliance with any system of
priorities that is established. Of course a transition to a system of broadcasting based on
other than private for-profit entities is possible, and this Article suggests such a shift.
However, a primarily private for-profit system must be assumed given the present structure of broadcasting and the American economy.
31. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), in which the Court
approved the FCC requirement that private licensees have the burden of broadcasting
views and political opinions contrary to their own, as supported by the requirements of

LOCAL SERVICE CONCEPT

caster owes a duty to the public under the first amendment to provide a
32
variety of suitable programs.

The broadcaster nevertheless retains substantial countervailing first
amendment rights. The broadcaster may, consistent with the first amend33
ment, determine the content of substantially all the programs aired.
Practically and because of the need to be insulated from governmental
interference, the initial decision as to what programs are presented
is subject only to the discretion of the broadcaster.3 4 Thus, the electronic media editor has journalistic discretion to broadcast what is
deemed appropriate to the extent it is consistent with the public right of
access to diverse ideas and experiences. Thereafter, governmental inter3
vention must comport with the first amendment. 5
Since the inception of broadcast regulation,3 6 the FCC has followed
a policy of reviewing licensee programming content at the time of the
license renewal. 3 7 This retroactive policy review was implicitly approved
by the Court in Red Lion and explicitly held to be consistent with the
first amendment in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, which also continued

the special concern with the public interest in broadcast regulation. 8
Additionally, the Court in CBS reconciled Red Lion-which held that
the first amendment right of the viewers and listeners is superior to that
of the broadcasters-9 -by indicating that the broadcaster's first amendment rights, which are substantial but less than those of the print journalist, 40 are to be balanced with the first amendment rights of the
public. 41 The broadcaster's first amendment right is therefore consistent
47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976) (equal access for political candidates) and the fairness doctrine.
The Court stated:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which
are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity,
be barred from the airways.
395 U.S. at 389.
32. See Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming Inquiry, 20
Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1901 (1960).
33. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 116-19, 120-21, 125 (1973). "A
broadcast licensee has a large measure of journalistic freedom, but not as large as that
experienced by a newspaper." Id. at 117-18. Congress "intended to permit private
broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public
obligations." Id. at 110.
34. See note 33 supra.
35. Retroactive review is not considered censorship. See note 37 infra. This result is
necessary to avoid the prohibition of censorship of 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976).
36. See note 37 infra.
37. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 736-38 (1978). The Court discussed
KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931), and
Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933). 438 U.S. at 736 n.10. These two cases are the
source of the policy of review.
38. 438 U.S. at 748-49.
39. 395 U.S. at 390.
40. 412 U.S. 94, 117-18 (1973); see note 33 supra and accompanying text.
41. 412 U.S. at 118, 121-23.
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with the public right to the extent possible, 42 but the public right
remains paramount.4
Although the Court in CBS expressed the importance of and need
for a general way of achieving a balance between public and broadcaster rights, little guidance is provided beyond the Red Lion description 44 of the public right and the characterization of the broadcaster's
right as substantial but of lesser magnitude. The Court noted two
associated problems undermining the argument that the broadcaster's
right was primary. First, neither the FCC nor Congress had adopted a
rule or statute to deal with the asserted first amendment right of the
public. 45 The absence of such a rule or statute highlights the importance
of the Red Lion dictum stating that broadcast coverage of controversial
issues could be compelled if the licensee sought to avoid its fairness doctrine obligation 46 - which requires fair coverage of controversial issues of
public importance-by remaining silent. 47 The second problem noted
by the Supreme Court was that the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in CBS had fashioned a rule mandating that broadcasters must permit a limited number of political advertisements. The
court's rule was suspect both as to whether it could be effectively
enforced and as to its impact on the first amendment rights and business
interests of the broadcaster.48 Accordingly, consistent with CBS, rules
can be promulgated requiring certain types of programming if the rules
respect and balance the interests of both the public and the broadcaster.
As a business, the broadcast enterprise intends to make a profit,
presumably the highest possible. 49 This results in a shift in concern from
first amendment rights to the nature of the business interest. While at
times the audience is treated as the market for radio and television, it is
a shadow market; 0 the true market is the advertisers. Revenues are
realized from advertisers, not listeners or viewers. Audience size does
influence the true market in a real way; to a large extent the size or
nature of the audience determines the amount advertisers will pay. The
primary goal of broadcasters as entrepreneurs is to achieve the size and
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 125.
Id. at 122.
See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
412 U.S, at 122-23.
See generally Fairness Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974). For a discussion of the

fairness doctrine in the context of local service, see notes 419-51 infra and accompanying
text.
47. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393-94 (1969). Neither the
FCC nor Congress mandated access for advertisement on political issues, and the question such a mandate would raise under the first amendment was not reached.
48. 412 U.S. at 124-29.
49. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 271-73 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) for an excellent discussion of the problem. See also id.
at 267-68.
50. See American Broadcasting Co., 7 F.C.C.2d 245, 306-09 (1966) (Johnson,
Comm'r, dissenting) (ABC-ITT merger).
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the nature of an audience for which advertisers will pay maximum
amounts."' This is unlike the typical market in which the consumer purchases the product directly. To the consumer, the received broadcast is
a free good. As a result, viewers and listeners will accept that which they
would not pay for. If a small number of viewers would pay for type X
programming, but a larger number will watch type Y if it is free, type Y
prevails, and the usual market mechanics of willingness to pay are
eliminated.5 2 This may well result in programming aimed at potential
purchasers of products rather than programs.
A successful policy favoring competition for advertising dollars
...may well result in, not creative journalism, but commercial pabulum directed toward those whose incomes are most
often spent on the advertiser's wares. A policy favoring quality
journalism, on the other hand, may be anti-competitive
[economically] since the broadcaster in pursuit of common
notions of journalistic excellence may refuse to direct his pro53
gramming at the optimal advertising audience.
This greatly affects local programming decisions; it often disadvantages
programs of local origin against network programs that return a higher
income. 5 4 Consideration of net revenue directly affects the choice of
nonnetwork-originated programs.55 Nonetheless, the function of the
business interest cannot be slighted. The income and profits of licensees
provide the wherewithal and impetus to fulfill the first amendment goals
of service to the public and expression by the licensee. Indeed, absent a
jarring modification of the means of financing broadcasting,5 6 profits
51. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
52. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 4, at 32.
A television system that charges a zero price for viewing provides neither the
incentive to broadcasters to produce programs that evoke the greatest viewer
satisfaction, nor the information on which to determine the most desired type
of programming.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also id. at 28.
53. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 271 (1974) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring) (footnote omitted); see id. at 267-68.
54. See, e.g., Review of Commission Rules and Regulatory Policies Concerning Network Broadcasting by Standard (AM) and FM Broadcast Stations, 63 F.C.C.2d 674,
688-89 (1977); Amendment of Part 72 of the Commission's Rules with Respect to Television Network Programs not Made Available to Certain Television Stations, 26 F.C.C.2d
772, 780-81 (1970).
55. The effect can be in favor of or against network programming. In most cases,
i.e., when network programming is available, it will be chosen because it will attract the
largest audience, because it is the most desirable programming available. If there is not
network competition, local programming will probably be preferred. Even with lower
advertising rates, the margin of profit for low cost, low quality programming will exceed
that of network programming. This phenomenon apparently occurs in the Prime Time
Access Hour rates. See notes 392-415 infra.
56. Subscription television is a partial relief to current problems of broadcast financing. Increasing funding from those sources used by public television (government, foundations, and private philanthropists) would require less fundamental change and would
incorporate sources already marginally affecting most viewers.
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are essential to fulfill the first amendment function of broadcasters.
Both as a matter of equity to broadcasters as entrepreneurs and as an
essential means of achieving the first amendment goals, the broadcast
profits must be respected.
Elucidating the problem of proper balance and of compelling legal
significance is the definition of superior service in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC. 7 In that case the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit rejected an FCC policy statement 8 granting an
incumbent licensee with a record of substantial past service without
serious defect a controlling advantage against a challenging applicant
for that license.5 9 The court held that the incumbent licensee, as a
public trustee, should be given a preference only for "superior service,"
which was defined in substantial part as the willingness of the licensee to
forego benefit from profit by reinvesting in programming for the public
benefit and by reducing advertising time. 60
Citizens Communications Center provides two important
guidelines. First, the business interest of the licensee is limited by the
public interest . 6 The Communications Act "public interest, conven62
ience and necessity" standard does not forbid a licensee's profitability,
but it does require the licensee to share financial benefits with the
public by providing improved service. 63 This is fully consistent with the
licensee's status as nonowner of its frequency and as a public trustee
obligated to act in the public interest. Second, the standard for superior
service dealing with the relationship of financial return to improved programming is stated generally, both in terms of the financial burden on
57. 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 & n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Central Fla. Enterprises

Inc. v. FCC, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 345, 350-51, amended on rehearing, 44 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1567 (1979).
Specifically, the court in Citizens Communications Center stated:

Along with elimination of excessive and loud advertising and delivery of quality
programs, one test of superior service should certainly be whether and to what
extent the incumbent has reinvested the profit on his license to the service of

the viewing and listening public.
447 F.2d at 1213 n.35. See also Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 463 F.2d 822,

823-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (denying mandamus action to force rule making on issue of
superior service); Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 24 F.C.C.2d 383, 386 (1970) (denying on rehearing rule making to clarify

definition of superior service).
58. See Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular
Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 424-25 (1970).
59, 447 F.2d at 1203-05.
60. Id. at 1213 n.35.

61. See id. n.36.
62. Id. nn.35 & 36. The Citizens Communication Center case does not address the
important question of the degree of reinvestment that should be expected for a superior
service rating. It would be necessary to permit appropriately above average profits as a
compensation for the risk at the initial entry stage and as an incentive for performance.
See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 4, at 79-90.

63. See note 57 supra.
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the licensee and, more importantly, in terms of the nature of the
64
reinvestment of profit for public benefit.
One must recognize that the burden the superior service standard
imposes on the first amendment rights of the broadcaster is ameliorated,
and the impairment of the broadcaster's first amendment right in the
balance against the public first amendment right is reduced, if any programming requirements imposed by the FCC are stated in terms of
general categories and minimum quality standards, rather than explicitly delineated. When the constraint is general and imposed on a
limited percentage of broadcasting time, with otherwise unfettered
licensee discretion, the balance between first amendment interests of the
public and of the broadcaster avoids unduly infringing on the broadcaster's interest.
This general approach of balancing the public interest with the
broadcaster's interest in light of the business nature of the broadcasting
enterprise has been accepted in two important situations. In situations
in which a change in program format65 is proposed after sale of the
license, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
found that some profit, not maximum profit, is the limit of the licensee's
entitlement. In addition, the court of appeals has assumed limited
authority over program content to the extent of directing a licensee to
maintain a format.6 ' The intervention goes no further. Particular programs in the format are not examined. The court of appeals is, in
effect, ordering the licensee within general but certain bounds to forego
profits to serve the public interest by providing certain programming.
In In re Patsy Mink (WHAR) 6s the FCC approached the problem
of balancing public and broadcaster first amendment interests by allowing the licensee to retain channeled discretion. The FCC found that the
fairness doctrine required coverage by a West Virginia licensee of a strip
mining controversy.6 9 By mandating coverage of a subject of local
importance, the FCC followed the Red Lion dictum that permitted
required coverage and reached an outcome inherent in the fairness doctrine and the public interest standard. When WHAR is considered in
conjunction with the format change cases,7 0 it also illustrates a sliding
scale of coverage. In most situations, a requirement that the licensee
64. See note 57 supra.
65. See notes 274-367 infra and accompanying text.
66. In all the format change cases remanded by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit to the FCC, the transferring licensee was profitable or the issue was
in controversy. When the licensee was profitable, the FCC transfer approval was upheld.
See notes 282-94, 356 infra and accompanying text (discussing format change cases).
67. See notes 275-364 infra and accompanying text (discussing format change cases).
68. 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976). For a full discussion of the case, see notes 410-34 infra
and accompanying text.
69. 59 F.C.C.2d at 995-97.
70. See notes 275-367 infra and accompanying text.
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must deal with environmental problems would suffice. In WHAR,
however, the licensee clearly had abused its discretion;" it is bad faith
for a broadcaster to operate in coal country and ignore strip mining, an
important environmental subject. Moreover, even though the WHAR
decision is specific as to subject matter, the method of coverage and the
weight to be accorded various views remained with the licensee. 7 2 As a
result, the speech rights of the public and of the broadcasters are left in
balance. If the public's Red Lion right is to have meaning, it must be
enforced when disregarded cavalierly by the broadcaster. On the other
hand, the balanced protection of journalistic discretion can be ensured
by good faith exercise of that discretion. The broadcaster, as journalist,
loses only a measure of that discretion and then only when good faith is
abandoned. General compliance is forced on the broadcaster, while the
specific implementation is left largely to discretion; only the question of
implementation, not its content, becomes a matter of FCC concern.
B.

Achieving Superior ProgrammingService7

3

The problem becomes how to meet the ideal of local programming
while considering the business nature of broadcasting and the first
amendment rights of the broadcaster. 4 Business decisions will frequently
run against local programming.7 5 Emphasizing the broadcaster's first
amendment right to the exclusion of the public's first amendment right
will elevate business-motivated decisions over the need for local programming. Decisions based on these factors may not please a large part of
the public. Some potential listeners or viewers will be repelled by programming that draws an audience of the magnitude or sort that advertisers desire. 7 6 Nor will journalistic discretion, which is at the core of the
broadcaster's first amendment rights, 77 result in serice for all.
In addition, some radio and television is used because it is free. The
viewer or listener accepts the best alternative. 78 Such program choice
dilutes measurement of intensity of desire for some types of presentations, so the degree of deprivation is not clear from mere numbers. 79
71. Discretion is defined throughout as the power to make a decision within defined
general bounds. Too often it seems that the FCC abjures developing the general bounds
and grants discretion in a broader sense to the licensee, that is, discretion to make a
decision as the licensee sees fit, without guidance. Although the FCC does not articulate
this grant of discretion, it does, in reality, occur. See generally Policy Statement on
Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
72. 59 F.C.C.2d at 994.
73. The discussion in this section focuses on local programming service. As an
abstract proposition, however, the discussion applies to any choice of programming
other than the choice that would be made by the licensee without regulation.
74. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 270-73 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
75. See R. NOLL, M. PECK &J. McGOWAN, supra note 4, at 110-11.

76. See id. at 267-68.
77. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973).
78. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 4, at 28, 32-33.

79. See id. at 21-23.
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Similarly, there is no assurance that the best programming, either from
a community political need or aesthetic viewpoint, will be presented.
Certainly, the willingness of some citizens groups to fight to preserve
many types of programs involving various tastes indicates the intensity of
the perceived need for the numerous types of aesthetic, cultural, and
public affairs programming involved.
Thus, a group of viewers of between fifteen to twenty percent of the
market warrants service if there are sufficient radio stations in the
market to serve both that group and larger groups.8 0 Yet, the conclusion
one must draw from this situation is that it can be economically more
attractive to neglect a relatively significant, strongly interested minority
and to program for larger group interests. Indeed, taking a simple
market with three stations, if twenty percent of the audience desired
fare other than sports, but three simultaneous sports programs would
draw respectively 30%, 27%, and 23% of the audience, the size of
8
audience would dictate three sports programs. ' Such an approach
emphasizes the advertisers' desire for a large audience. This choice is
made in the absence of the usual control and discipline of consumers who
must pay for the product. No true market can exist unless the intensity
82
of desire measured by willingness to pay is a determinative factor. This
is true of advertisers, but not of viewers or listeners.
Of course, other factors do enter into programming decisions.
Smaller audiences may be acceptable because of their composition. Profitable businesses also may undertake public service activities purely out
of a feeling of civic responsibility or from a need to improve their image
in the community and hence improve their profits. A journalistic ethic
of full and fair inquiry may prevail, as may the desire of the owners to
promote their own ideas and ideologies. 8 3 Too much reliance on these
factors would be naive, however. Most broadcasters are ultimately
businesspersons who will try to achieve high profits from their enterprises.
Given the nature of the broadcaster's interest and of the public
80. See Citizens Comm. to Preserve the Voice of the Arts v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263,
269-72 (D.C. Cir. 1970). This and other cases on this general point are discussed in notes
282-301 infra.
81. See Sirlam & Kalin, The Merits of Reserving the Cost-Savings from Domestic
Communication Satellites for Support of Education Television, 77 YALE L.J. 494, 516
(1968) (supplying basis for hypothetical).
82. The public interest standard is defined in note 20 supra. Within a general amorphous standard there will be many conflicts, including the rights of the listening public
and the licensee. An equitable resolution of these conflicts is essential for all FCC policy.
83. See WTAR Radio Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 812, 830 (1970) (licensee has no duty to
editorialize); cf. RKO Gen., Inc., 16 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1181, 1181 (1969) (failure to
editorialize adverse factor in comparative hearing). See generally Daly v. United States,
286 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1971); In re Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.
1246, 1250 (1949); see also Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450'
F.2d 642, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd. sub nom. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973); Storer Broadcasting Co., 60 F.C.C.2d 1097, 1100 (1976).
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interest, it will be difficult to resolve the conflicts within the public
interest standard of the Communications Act. There must be an articulation of goals that have some clarity and on which specific, certain
standards can be built. This requires a willingness to question past
policies and to undertake experimentation. Put another way, it requires
an actual utilization of administrative flexibility, a neglected ideal. It
also requires a meaningful commitment to firm enforcement of the
definitive standards.8 4 Such an approach, given a proper concern for the
first amendment, will both ameliorate concerns of excessive governmental intervention and provide the licensee a high degree of stability while
vindicating the public interest. Before going beyond the basic
framework of analysis, however, it is necessary to survey the components
of and the reasons for imposing a local service obligation and the efforts

to enforce it.
II.

THE LOCAL SERVICE OBLIGATION: SOURCE,
ENFORCEMENT, AND CONSEQUENCES

A.

Local Service Obligation: Its Definition and Its Source
1.

Local Service: Definition, Source, and Attainment

The local service obligation is a product of two broad, interrelated
concepts: (1) the requisite geographic distribution of licenses to operate
radio and television stations, as demonstrated by the Communications
Act: "[T]he Commission shall make such distribution of licenses . * *
among the several states and communities to provide a fair, efficient,
and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same;1 85 and
(2) the stations' obligation to identify and to program for local needs
and problems. "The principle ingredient of a licensee's obligation is the
diligent, positive and continuing effort by the licensee to discover and
fulfill the problems, needs and interests of the public within the station's
service area.18 6 The attainment of the second concept depends on proper
84. The concept of definitive standards is advanced as a goal of the FCC. It makes no
sense to talk in general terms of programming for local areas, or in the terms of Citizens
Communication Committee standard. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
Rather, the FCC should establish precise standards of expectation, as suggested in Part
IV of this Article, or not expect local service. Either is plausible, but the nebulous, nonenforced policy followed at present is not.

85. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1976). This provision specifically requires fair, efficient, and
equitable distribution, but does not require assignments to every community. Fewer,
more powerful stations that will broaden service areas fairly, efficiently, and equitably
will meet the statutory mandate. See notes 457-62 infra and accompanying text.
86. Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d
418, 441 (1975), as amended by 61 F.C.C.2d 1, 1 (1976) (amendments do not affect
local service obligation). For the history of the statute, see note 4 supra. In this
Article, "need," when applied to audience program preferences, includes all wants,
desires, and problems. It is essentially all-inclusive. "Problem" is used in its dictionary
sense and that employed by the FCC. These usages are consistent. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 656
(1971). Other terms applied to audience preferences are used in their dictionary sense
and as used by the FCC, if applicable.
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implementation of the first. To a large measure, justification of the

first concept depends on the validity, as articulated and enforced, of the
second. When examined critically, this policy and its enforcement are

open to serious challenge.
The local service obligation can be regarded as a success in the

geographic sense. Fair and equitable service has been provided to all
parts of the nation, fulfilling an unequivocal legislative mandate that

requires a fair, efficient, and equitable division of radio and television
services among the states and communities.8 7 Concomitant to this is the
policy that every person must be adequately served by radio and televi-

sion outlets."" The FCC has acted as a traffic controller for frequency
assignments, albeit one with some policy concerns. In creating a pattern
of effective frequency assignments, the FCC has successfully fulfilled its
8 9
obligation of geographic distribution.

The second aspect of the local service obligation deals with identification of local needs and problems. The desire to regulate radio arose

from a technical necessity-the chaos that ensued without regulation.9"
This made a traffic controller function essential and the geographic

aspect necessary, but the programming aspect remains problematic.
Notwithstanding that only bars to obscenity, 91 lotteries,9
93

other areas,

and equal time

concepts94

2

censorship in

have definitions clearer than

the general statutory standard of "public interest, convenience and

necessity,"9 the public interest mandate does not provide clear guidance
in the particular area of local service programming or effective guidance
in other regulation of programming.9 6 This may be intentional, because
87. 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1976).
88. See, e.g., Rounsaville of Louisville, Inc. v. FCC, 314 F.2d 280, 281 (D.C. Cir.
1963); Interstate Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Policy Statement On Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast Facilities
Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190, 191 (1965); Clear Channel Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band, 31 F.C.C. 565, 567 (1961); Plainview Radio, 31
F.C.C. 259, 259 (1961); Tomah-Maustom Broadcasting Co., 28 F.C.C. 1, 2 (1960);
Wendell Mayes, 7 F.C.C. 510, 511 (1939).
89. See generally NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 206 (1943), discussed in note
377 infra.
90. See id.
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976).
92. Id. § 1304; see New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990,
995 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970).
93. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976); see McIntire v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 151
F.2d 597, 601 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779 (1946).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976); see Farmers Educ. & Co-op Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360
U.S. 525, 526 (1959). See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
377 (1969); The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine, 58 F.C.C.2d
691, 692 (1974), affd in part sub nom. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Fairness Doctrine Report 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 30
(1974); see also Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060, 1066 (1st Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
96. The Communications Act provides for equal access for political candidates, 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1976), and forbids censorship, id. § 326. No other program standards are
set forth in the Communications Act.
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Congress can use this approach to avoid the onus of controversial legislation or unsuccessful policy.9 7 Moreover, because the FCC is inhibited by
a lack of guidance" and funds and by a viewpoint closely aligned to the
broadcast industry, there is a lack of governmental guidance or programming requirements. 9 Accordingly, the problem of ascertaining
and achieving a satisfactory level of programming for local needs and
problems is left largely to the discretion of the private licensee whose
actions are assumed to be those of a trustee for the public and thus beneficial to the public. 0 0 This assumption is both crucial and of dubious
validity.
97. See Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183,
1194-98 (1973) (discussing Federal Communications Act and FCC).
98. Id. at 1191-97. This may be intentional. See Friendly, The FederalAdministrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1055,
1057-72 (1962) (discussing FCC's failure to evolve standards).
99. This does not mean the relationship is sinister, but it is a consequence of a longterm relationship between any agency and the industry it regulates. See Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
In the midst of a "growing sense of disillusion with the role which regulatory
agencies play," many legislators, judges, and legal and economic commentators have accepted the thesis of persistent bias [toward the regulated] in
agency polices. At its crudest, this thesis is based on the "capture" scenario, in
which administrations are systematically controlled, sometimes corruptly, by
the business firms within their orbit of responsibility, whether regulatory or
promotional. But there are more subtle explanations of industry orientation,
which include the following:
First.-. . . [T]he administrator whose power is essentially negative . . . is
dependent on industry cooperation in order to achieve his objectives ....
[This] places the administrator in an inherently weak position. The administrator will, nonetheless, be held responsible if the industry suffers serious
economic dislocation ....
Second. -The regulatory bureaucracy... seeks to elaborate and perfect the
controls it exercises ....

The effect of this ...

is to eliminate ...

competition

and buttress the position of the established firms.
Third.-The resources-in terms of money, personnel, and political influence -of the regulatory agency are limited in comparison to those of regulated
firms ....

Fourth.- Limited agency resources imply that agencies must depend on outside sources of information, policy development, and political support. This
outside input comes primarily from organized interests ....

By contrast, the

personal stake in agency policy of an individual member of an unorganized
interest, such as a consumer, is normally too small to justify such representation ....

As a somewhat disillusioned James Landis wrote in 1960, the result is

industry dominance in representation, which has a "daily machine-gun like
impact on both [an] agency and its staff" that tends to create an industry bias
in the agency's outlook.
These various theses of systematic bias in agency policy are not universally
valid. Political pressures and judicial controls may force continuing agency
adherence to policies demonstrably inimical to the interests of the regulated
industry .

. .

. Moreover, the fact that agency policies may tend to favor

regulated interests does not in itself demonstrate that such policies are unfair
or unjustified .

. .

. Nonetheless, the critique of agency discretion as unduly

favorable to organized interests ... has sufficient power and verisimilitude to
have achieved widespread contemporary acceptance.
Id, at 1685-87 (footnotes omitted).
100. E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 383 (1969).
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Nevertheless, if the requirement of fair and equitable geographic
service to the nation in conjunction with the public interest, convenience, and necessity standard is to have a rational meaning,' 0 ' the
geographic requirement must result in service to localities, which
translates into programs for localities. 0 2 While geographic allocation of
frequencies is a straightforward mandate, programming for localities'
interest, convenience, and necessity is a murky and general standard.
Yet the difficulty in defining and ascertaining the requisite programming obligation has not inhibited general acceptance of the local service
concept as an abstract theory. Also, the local service concept has drawn
little criticism even from those who raise significant and harsh complaints against the general regulation of the broadcast industry and the
radio spectrum. 03 However, the FCC's application of the local service
concept has been marked by a noted absence of praise. 0 4 The acceptance of the local service concept is difficult to explain, but the absence
of praise for FCC application is not. 0 5 A careful examination of the
local service doctrine casts doubt on whether it has achieved or can ever
achieve what its advocates hope, especially without profound harm.
Accordingly, the reasons for the vitality of the concept, for hopes in it,
and for its failure must be explored. 06
2.

Why Local Service

Since the inception of federal broadcast regulation, local service
requirements have existed as an ongoing concern in allocation of broadcast frequencies among local communities. 0 7 While the FCC's allocation objective is plain, the reasons for this objective, beyond the
necessary technical requirements, are less clear.
The pervasive desire of the American people to diffuse political
power encourages commitment of power to local entities. Coupled with
101. They may well have no more rational meaning than that they are an acceptable

political compromise. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1695-97 (1975). This is not necessarily unwise. Id. Nevertheless,
the Court and the agencies hive consistently attempted legal definition of the public
interest, convenience, and necessity standards. Id.

102. See Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf. Newhouse Broadcasting Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 966, 975-78 (1975) (ability of licensee to meet local needs
from nonlocal program sources).
103. See R. NOLL, M. PECK &J. McGOWAN, supra note 4, at 99-110 (discussing pervasive reliance on local service concept by FCC). See generally Broadcasting in America

and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1
(1968). Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, the study's coauthor, during and after his
tenure at the FCC was one of the most vocal critics of the FCC policies. The Oklahoma
Study praises local service, but condemns FCC acceptance of the shortfalls described in
that study.
104. See Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 3-5 (1968).

105. See notes 275-81 infra.
106. See text accompanying notes 107-19 infra.
107. See notes 71-78 supra.
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this desire is the widely advanced argument that the electronic media
exert great, even undue, influence, and that this influence should be
diluted. t08 There is no doubt that television is an enormously influential
source of information. Thus, in addressing the regulatory problem of
the electronic media in the context of indecent language, the Supreme
Court emphasized that "the broadcast media have established a uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."' 0 9 Surveys rank the
broadcast media as the most important source of public information,' 1 0
but multiple sources of information are available to virtually everyone.
No doubt, in a democracy multiple sources of information are desirable,
at least to the minimal extent that all that is worth being heard on
important subjects and compelling concerns is available to audiences."'
Nonetheless, the local service concept as a geographic idea does not
address this objective. Local programming does not increase the number
of sources; it simply changes control and use of the limited number of
broadcast channels available. Thus, the goal of diverse service to the
public that the FCC should, and to a degree does, pursue is better
addressed by an effort to increase sources.
The idea that local stations should be a vital, integral part of their
respective communities is easily accepted. To fulfill that role, local stations must provide programming appropriate to the communities they
serve. Local stations should reflect the ebb and flow of their place of
license and offer amenities and assistance to the community that otherwise are not available. One cannot quarrel with this in substance, but
only in degree. Important coverage of issues such as drought conditions
is provided, while announcements concerning local events, assistance in
finding dogs, and broadcasting high school football games are appropriate amenities. Coverage of international affairs or the national economy
108. See Collins, The Future of Cable Communicationsand the Fairness Doctrine, 24
CATH. U.L. REV. 833, 840-43 (1975) and authorities cited therein. See also Powell, "Or
Of the [Broadcast]Press," 55 TEx. L. REV. 39, 58-62 (1976) (discussing and rejecting
power of broadcast media as basis for consideration). Today the focus is on television,
but at an earlier time it was on radio. Television does have an impact in several aspects.
Its quantitative aspect, i.e., its role as an information source, can be verified and is very
important, but its social and psychological impact is difficult to measure. Anything but
an inductive analysis is virtually impossible because of the problem of establishing a control group or other means of evaluation. Still, this approach lends enough support to the
conclusion that there is sufficient impact to allow it to pass judicial muster. Cf. Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-70 (1973) (discussing The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography390-412 (1970) and its weak Hill-Link minority
report but rejecting argument that, absent scientific evidence to conclusively demonstrate obscene material adversely affects persons or society, state regulation of pornography impermissible).
109. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
110. See B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 120 (1976); Frank,

Media of Technological Revolution, 60 GEO. L.J. 934, 936 (1972).
111. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 24-28 (1960); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 210-13. The reader should
consider the interrelationship of the cognate rules of the fairness doctrine and § 315 of
the Communications Act. See also note 85 supra.
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are not appropriate matters of local service. In addition, much service,
especially on television, but also on the radio, deals with real community
112
needs and interests that are also fundamentally national.
Beyond this is a vision both realistic and overly heroic:
The future of this country hinges on the ability of individual cities to create communication where it has never existed
before. Only local media can serve that need. And indeed, in
large part only local broadcast stations can serve that
need ....

For many Americans, if it is not on radio or televi-

113
sion, it might as well not have happened at all.
This clarion call for better and more vital local service by broadcasters is
overdrawn, even though unquestionably local political and social institutions need to be more functional and responsive. The broadcast media
could occupy an important role in achieving that result." 4 Local broadcast service has its limits, however, even as a communicator of local concerns, and the homogeneity of our nation ensures the necessity of the
national element in broadcast service.
The acceptance of existing broadcast policy positions without
reflection explains much of the emphasis on local service. At the inception of regulation much, probably most, service was of local origin.",
The emerging commercial networks were not yet dominant,11 6 nor did
technology permit stations of extensive service. 7 Perhaps most importantly, the nation was more diverse." 8 Local community problems were

112. The preservation of the Vieux Carre in New Orleans from interstate highways,
see N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 1975, at 20, col. 1, conflict over the west-side interstate in
New York City, see id., April 20, 1978, at 1, col. 5, and the protection of Hilton Village
in Newport News, Virginia, from widening Warwick Boulevard, see Newport News,
Hampton, Virginia, Daily Press, March 19, 1978, at 3, col. 1, are representative of the
broader national problem of accommodating the automobile and civilization. Although
such issues are usually treated as local problems, the conflicts presented reach across our
society. These and multitudinous other problems deserve broad attention and can best
be covered either by syndication or by networks, see notes 249-55 infra and accompanying text, supplemented with local coverage of their exclusively local ramifications.
113. Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma
Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1968). The study also states:
And further, the greatest challenge before the American people today is the
challenge of restoring and reinvigorating local democracy. That challenge cannot be met without a working system of local broadcast media actively serving
the needs of the community for information about its affairs, serving the interests of all members of the community, and allowing all to confront the listening public with their problems and their proposals.
Id. at 12.
114. The need is so apparent and compelling that it should be mandated by rules. A
rule structure proposal is discussed at notes 544-91 infra.
115. See E. BARNOUW, A TOwER IN BABEL 209 (1966).
116. Id.
117. See Crosley Corp. v. FCC, 106 F.2d 833, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 605 (1939).
118. National diversity can be emphasized to excess, however, for the United States
was a rather homogeneous nation by 1927, when the Radio Act was passed. The radio
networks were in their infancy. These networks, followed by the television networks,
were among the most conspicuous and important factors furthering homogeneity. Of
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to some extent recurrent across the nation. To a substantial degree the
perceived differences were the result of parochialism. Even in the 1920s
and 1930s the United States was moving toward homogeneity. Electronic
communications that were to further this move toward homogeneity
were becoming established. Although the perception of need for service
to localities in the late 1920s was certainly more understandable and
realistic than today, the conclusion that the need was great was not
compelled. Some lack of certainty of the central role of local service
should have existed. Local service as a central goal should not have been
accepted as unquestionably as in the scheme of the Radio Act of
1927.119
Since the 1920s, local service has been the course of least resistance.
The virtue of localism is easily and abundantly praised in America. The
fear of undue concentration of influence is real. The FCC and Congress
found a convenient regulatory system, and in it the industry found an
acceptable criterion, especially when not too severely enforced. This
general, widespread, universal acceptance deserves critical appraisal.
B.

The Rule Structure Concept: Interim FCC Failure

Consideration of the local service obligation demonstrates its
weakness in conception and implementation. The reasons for the failure
in implementation of the obligation are twofold. First, the FCC has consistently failed, indeed refused, to articulate reasonably precise goals
and standards. 120 The failure to establish such goals and standards,
described over fifteen years ago by Judge Friendly,' 2 ' remains
widespread in the FCC's domain. While the public's first amendment
and statutory interests are paramount, they must be reconciled with
other important interests. 122 The varied interests of the public, the
licensee journalist, the licensee entrepreneur, the program's producers,
the commercial network, the advertisers, and other parties are difficult
to accommodate in any single regulatory policy. This difficulty is compounded because there exists within the public constituency itself a
multitude of inconsistent interests. Further, the FCC is permeable. The
course other factors were involved: the continuing development of a transportation network beyond railroads to the present interstate highway system and domestic air service;
the influence of other media, particularly motion pictures; the bringing together of
diverse groups in the three wars. Other factors operated as well. The point, however, is
not to essay a recent social history of the United States. Rather, it is to point out the
paradox that while the FCC focused on local service, the industry the FCC regulated
became an increasingly important factor in creating a country with problems nationwide
in their impact, rather than strictly local.
119. Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
120. See Friendly, The FederalAdministration Agencies; The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1055, 1057-72 (1962).
121. Id.

122. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); notes 22-24

supra and accompanying text.
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views of its various constituencies penetrate the agency, creating
substantial pressures and tensions that the agency must resolve or
avoid. 123 Fuzzy policy or casual enforcement often results.
Second, the FCC is unwilling to use coercion to achieve its goals.
The FCC avoids difficult policy issues concerning enforcement, which
greatly complicates analysis of FCC policy. 124 This is compounded by
the FCC's tendency to define protected first amendment rights in terms
of the licensee journalist, subordinating the public first amendment
rights and interests. 125 The FCC posits that if it intervenes, it will
impinge on the first amendement. FCC passivity either permits impingement on the public first amendment right or allows the maximum
expansion of the licensee's right. In addition, the FCC's failure to promulgate rules and policies serves to impede enforcement. It is unjust to
enforce rules that are uncertain to all parties and averse to the broadcaster's first amendment interests. The reluctance to use coercion results
from the American historical tendency of viewing the government as an
entity government, the suppressor and not the vindicator of the public
interest, motivated by proper instincts. Such a perspective, however, is
not good policy, nor is it supported by the law, and it is therefore
wrong. A more complex analysis, cognizant of the first amendment consequences, more precisely states the issue.
Some governmental coercion is necessary to ensure fulfillment of
the local service obligation; coercion adheres in and is necessary to any
system of regulation. Any civil and just body politic relies on it.126 The
licensee public trustee has duties that can with full justification be
enforced. Substantial sacrifices of profit and prerogative are conceivable
123. See Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183,
1197 (1973).

124. Thus, the FCC has never awarded a license to an applicant challenging an
incumbent licensee, Central Fla. Enterprises v. FCC, 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 345 (1978),
modified on rehearing,44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1567 (1979) (information provided by

FCC to court of appeals at court's request), nor used its network rules promulgated in
1942 to deny or revoke a license. L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 306
(3d ed. 1968). The same pattern of limited enforcement appears in the discussions of
FCC rules throughout this Article.
125. See Wilson, The Rise of the Bourgeoisie State, in PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 18 (R. Rabin ed. 1979). Professor Wilson argues:
There are at least three ways in which political power may be gathered,
and desirably in two bureaucratic hands: by the growth of an administrative
apparatus so large as to be immune from bureaucratic control, by placing
power over a government bureaucracy of any size in private rather than public
hands, or by vesting discretionary authority in the hands of a public agency so
that the exercise of that power is not responsive to the public good.
Id. at 18. As to telecommunication, see DeVaney, A PropertySystem for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-EngineeringStudy, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 1499, 1499-1503 (1969).
126. "It is reasonable to assume that even in a well-ordered society the coercive
powers of government are to some degree necessary for the stability of social cooperation." J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 240 (1972).
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to preserve the license and to retain some profit and prerogative. 27 To
achieve local service, the FCC must coerce; and it must coerce both the
28
licensee and the licensee-network relationship.1
With the general paradigm described, it is necessary to consider the
specifics of the effort, the particular problems, their implications, and
possible solutions.
C.
1.

The Efforts to Achieve Local Service

Solution to the Geographic Problem: The Allocation Scheme

Initially, the statutory requirement of local service was resolved largely
by broad allocation policies.1 29 The radio spectrum generally is divided
among the various radio services.1 3 0 Within the broadcast services, two
approaches to geographic division prevail, both of which attempt to provide each community with a service. First, an authorization for an AM or
standard broadcast service will be issued to any applicant who can meet
the general FCC standards and rules for affording technical protection
against interference and providing local service to the geographic area. 131
127. The FCC has recognized this problem, but has been loathe to issue specific
guidelines or take affirmative action. See, e.g., Advertising of Children's Premiums on
Television, 40 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1, 10-11 (1977) (FCC rejection of proposed standards for children's ads); Eugene Television Co., 61 F.C.C.2d 1131, 1131-32 (1976)
(broadcast of program length commercials contrary to prior representations admonihed, but positive action deferred until renewal); Old Dominion Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
25 F.C.C.2d 629, 632 (1970) (subordination of public interest to commercial interest by
allowing sponsor to influence program control); Accomack-Northampton Broadcasting
Co., 8 F.C.C.2d 357, 359 (1967) (approval of new permit despite licensee policy that
would allow 33 minutes of advertising per hour); Commercial Advertising Standards, 1
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1606, 1610-11 (1964) (recognizing power of FCC to regulate overcommercialization but failing to adopt specific standards); cf. Sunbeam Television Corp.
v. FCC, 243 F.2d 26, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (court on own motion requested briefs to
address length and number of commercials as part of public interest consideration).
The probable solution has been suggested in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC
and the fairness doctrine cases. However, the fundamental problems remain-lack of
clear rules and inconsistent enforcement. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC,
447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also note 57 supra.
128. The unwillingness to accept the fact that real coercion is required is at the root
of many of the FCC's problems. This probably stems from the American aversion to
internal governmental intervention in private affairs, even when such intervention is
necessary to achieve a desired goal.
129. These policies, see notes 130-37 infra and accompanying text, implement the
requirement of 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)-(h), 307(b) (1976).
130. 47 C.F.R. § 2.105 (1978). The radio spectrum is divided into various uses, which
are referred to as services. AM radio, FM radio, and television are thus examples of services discussed in this Article. Various other uses are assigned by the FCC or the Office
of Telecommunication Policy, Department of Commerce.
131. See id. § 73.24. In the AM allocation, to meet the first element in the local service and technical protection requirements, the frequency must be between 535 and
1605 khz and be carried on one of the 107 channels in successive steps of 10 khz. See id.
§§ 73.2, .3. Stations are then classed by power, time of operation, and type of service
and assigned to channels.
Class I stations are unlimited time stations designed to serve broad areas with no
objectionable interference to its primary signal, id. § 73.182, and with only adjacent
channel interference to secondary signals, id. § 73.21(a)(1). This power is limited to 50
kw. Id. § 73.182(a)(1)(ii).
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Second, FM1 3 2 and television assignments133 are made by a table of
assignments established by FCC rules that tie certain frequencies to certain locations.
Similar simple standards control both approaches either in licensing
assignment or rule making. First, a broadcasting station must meet the
technical and other basic requirements of the Communications Act."'
Class II is a wide-area service station with primary service limited by and subject to
such interference as may be received from a Class I station. In addition, they must avoid
interference with Class I stations. Id. § 73.21(a)(2). This Class is subdivided into several
subclasses. Class II-A channels are assigned to particular communities in certain states,
id. § 73.21(a)(2)(i), on the basis of the Clear Channel Broadcasting Order, 31 F.C.C.
565, 604 (1961). Class II-B stations are unlimited as to time of operation with a
power range of 0.25 to 50 kw. 47 C.F.R. § 73.21(a)(2)(i) (1978). Class II-D (there is no
Class II-C) stations operate during either daytime or other limited time at 0.25 to 50 kw.
of power. Id. § 73.21(a)(2)(iii).
Class III stations are regional channels designed to serve populated areas and contiguous rural areas. Id. § 73.21(b)(1). The Class is further subdivided into two types of stations subject to general interference rules. Id. § 73.182(a)(3). Class III-A stations have a
power range of 1-5 kw. Id. § 73.21(b)(1)(i). Class III-B have a power range of 0.5 to 1
kw. at night, or 5 kw. during the day. Id. § 73.21(b)(1)(ii).
Class IV stations serve cities, towns, and their immediate areas. Id. § 73.21(c)(1). They
operate at a minimum power of 0.25 kw., with a maximum power of 0.25 kw. at night
and 1 kw. during the day. Id. § 73.21(c)(1).
The general interference standards set forth in the regulations apply to these channels. The regulation prohibits overlap of the contours of the signal of stations of various
classes on cochannel, and on various adjacent channels. Id. § 73.3 7(a). The need to protect these contours imposes the restraint on new AM stations.
132. 47 C.F.R. § 73.201 (1978). The FM band, 88 mc/s to 108 mc/s, is divided into
100 channels of 200 kc/s. Id. Assignments are then made to localities, subject to spacing
requirements that vary with class and zone. Id. § 73.203. Zones are based primarily on
population density. The northeast is Zone I; southern California, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands are Zone I-A; and the remainder of the United States is Zone II. Id.
§ 73.205.
Class A stations serve a small city, town, or community and surrounding areas, id.
§ 73.206(a)(2), with power limited to 3 kw. and antenna height limited to 300 feet above
average terrain, id. § 73.206(a)(3). Class B stations operate on either Class B or C

assigned channels in Zone I and I-A with power limited to 50 kw. with an antenna
height not to exceed 500 feet above average terrain. Id. § 73.206(b)(2), (3). Class B sta-

tions serve large cities and contiguous areas. Id. § 73.206(b)(2). Class C stations are

assigned Class B and C channels in Zone II and serve broad areas. Id. § 73.206(b)(4).
Class C station power is limited to 100 kw. with an antenna limit of 2000 feet above
average terrain. Id. § 73.206(b)(5). Class D educational stations are permitted a power
of no more than 10 watts. Id. § 73.506(a)(1). Other educational stations operate under
the same restrictions unless they are commercial stations, id. § 73.504(b)(2), or special

channel assignments, id. § 73.501. No protection against interference other than space

between assignments, id. § 73.209, and power and antenna height limits, id. § 73.211, is

provided.
133. Television stations are not categorized and are assigned to localities. Id. §§
73.606, .607. In addition, the United States is divided into three zones of varying sizes,

with operation based on population density and climate. Id. § 73.609. Power and antenna
height limits are imposed by channel, because of varying propagation characteristics.
Id. § 73.614. Charts included in the regulations establish sliding scales of these factors

for zones. Id. § 73.699. No protection from interference, other than assignment separations, is provided. Id. § 73.612.

134. AM assignments are made on the basis of the Act's requirements, tracked in 47
C.F.R. § 73.24(a)-(f), (k) (1978). The licensee must also meet interference requirements,
id. § 73.24(h), (i); id. § 73.37, and the general AM rules, id. pt. 73(a).
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Second, the license assignments will go to unserviced localities over serviced localities. 13 5 Third, when one of two mutually exclusive applicants
will provide a third (or greater) broadcast service and the other applicant will provide a second service, the need for the second broadcast service will control.13 6 In all other situations, factors other than geographic
allocation will determine the award of license; if there are not multiple
applicants for a frequency, in most situations the applicant seeking a
broadcasting license need only meet the general FCC standards after a
potential assignment has been found. 37
The assignment schemes for AM and FM radio have not been
challenged. 3 8 In Yankee Network, Inc. 13 9 the original television allocation plan was challenged on the theory that section 307(b) of the Communications Act not only required an equitable geographic distribution
of licenses,1 40 but also required that the distribution be made through
individual licensing procedures rather than rule making. The FCC
rejected this contention 42 by relying on its authority under section 303
to promulgate rules and regulations, including specific authority (1) to
classify stations on the basis of the service a station is to render, 143 (2) to
assign bands to the various services and to determine frequencies and
power of individual stations,144 and (3) to establish the coverage of stations. 1 4 In Logansport BroadcastingCo. v. United States14 the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted the FCC's general
rule making authority and found that many questions within the FCC's
jurisdiction can be resolved either by adjudication or by rule making
within the agency's informed discretion. 147 The experience of the AM and
FM allocation plan, in which individual licensees were assigned nationwide on the basis of a rule making, was found to be a sufficient basis for
8 Therefore,
the FCC's decision to use rule making. 14
the court of appeals
14
sustained the FCC's plan and method of allocation.
135. Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast
Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190, 191 (1965).
136. FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1955).
137. See text accompanying notes 152-82 infra (discussion of suburban doctrine).
138. But see Goodwill Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
139. 12 F.C.C. 1043 (1948) (applicant for channel in Bridgeport, Connecticut, sought
consolidated hearings with two Hartford, Connecticut, applicants; FCC rejected request).
140. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
141. 12 F.C.C. at 1043-44.
142. Id. at 1044.
143. Id. at 1043 (applying 47 U.S.C. § 303(a)-(b) (1976)).
144. Id. (applying 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1976)).
145. Id. (applying 47 U.S.C. § 303(d) (1976)).
146. 210 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Appellant objected to the assignment of Channel
10 VHF to Terre Haute, Indiana, rather than Logansport, Indiana, and Owensboro,
Kentucky. The objection was rejected. Id. at 28. See also Peoples Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 209 F.2d 286, 287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (earlier, less well-reasoned case
that court refused to distinguish in Logansport).
147. 210 F.2d at 27.
148. Id. at 25, 27.
149. Id.
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The FCC has chosen a system of ad hoc allocation for AM radio
and an allocation system based on geographic locality for FM radio and
television.15 0 Since both allocation approaches are clearly workable, an
adequate system can be predicated on either. The problem is not the
system of allocation itself, but the other factors involved. FCC hesistancy
to consider and to resolve hard policy questions, even when fully informed,
casts grave doubt on the FCC's willingness to use the tools at its command. FCC indecision is not the only problem. Once the goal of the
geographic allocation plan is realized, the licensee can essentially act at
its discretion. In all likelihood, the licensee will turn to network programming if possible, because the affiliation with a network provides
popular programs that draw large audiences. This is reflected in payment from the networks for advertising that is network-originated and
results in higher charges to local advertisers.' 5' The result is an enormous diminution of local programs. The occurrence is so regular and
extensive that it alone jeopardizes the efforts to nurture local service.
Nevertheless, the particulars of the FCC effort must be examined.
2.

Community of Service: Where, Who, and What Service

In determining what location 52 (political subdivision or otherwise)
that a licensee is to serve, the problems of geographic distribution and
program content merge. It makes no sense to license a station to a community if that station will not provide service to the community. This
problem first became intense in radio. The FCC concluded in Huntington Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 53 in which the applicant would have
provided essentially the same signal to Los Angeles and its suburb Huntington Park, that in metropolitan areas a station licensed to a suburb
may actually serve the center city.1s4 Hence, to avoid suburban
assignments becoming central city assignments, a station is required to
55
serve the community of license.1
However, there are broader ramifications to determining the area
of service. A licensee, especially a licensee of a television station or a
powerful radio station, must provide service to its entire area of
coverage, in addition to its obligation to serve the needs and interests of
its city of license. 15 Furthermore, recent change of format cases cast
150. See notes 129-50 supra and accompanying text.
151. See notes 49-62 supra and accompanying text.
152. 47 C.F.R. § 73.30(a) (1976) defines location as "a . . . city, town, political subdivision, or community," which is doubtless part of the problem.
153. 14 F.C.C. 563 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

154. See id. at 583-84. The multiplicity of stations assigned to smaller political subdivisions in a relative homogeneous, one-market metropolitan area pushes toward this
result. Id.; see note 160 infra.

155. Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast
Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190, 193-94 (1965); see note 159

infra.
156. Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 327-28 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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doubt on the rationale of the requirement of service to a city of assignment, because the decisions consider all licensees assigned to a metropolitan area included in central city and suburban assignments, and thus
5 7
seem to run counter to the suburban community protection policy.
Still, the problem of determining community of service, in all its facets,
remains important. A series of rules and policies have developed to
158
determine what constitutes a geographic location.
The most difficult identification of community problems is
establishing whether service to a suburb is distinct from service to the
central city. By its Policy Statement 5 9 on the suburban community
issue, the FCC basically adopted the Huntington Broadcasting Co.1 60
rule, which was questioned in subsequent, factually distinguishable
litigation.' 6 ' The FCC attempted to avoid the tendency of stations with
157. See notes 160-69 infra (questioning FCC policy on this issue).
158. For the FCC's unhelpful general definition, see note 152 supra.
159. Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast
Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190 (1965). In Woodland
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 414 F.2d 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the policy statement eliminated one of two mutually exclusive applicants. That applicant asserted the statement
was arbitrary because previously the stations would have been treated equally as wide
area stations. Id. at 1162. The contention was rejected because of the FCC's experience
that small suburban stations tend to become central city stations, because the formula of
the statement was itself reasonable, and because the aplfellant had not been automatically rejected. Id. at 1164. For further comments on Woodland, see note 169
infra.
160. 192 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1951). In this case there were two mutually exclusive
applicants for a license (a third was disqualified for other reasons). One proposal was to
serve Los Angeles, the other to serve Huntington Park, a politically autonomous suburb
of Los Angeles. Id. at 34-35. Both proposals provided a fully adequate signal for
Huntington Park and essentially the same signal for Los Angeles and the metropolitan
area. The FCC ruled, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed, that because the service coverage was in fact for Los Angeles, the Huntington
Park applicant deserved no preference for providing that city a first primary service. Id.
at 35. The rule emerged that if a central city and suburban applicant both provided
high quality service to the entire metropolitan area, both would be regarded as central
city applicants for purposes of determining scope of service and community of license.

Id.
The FCC must determine, as a threshold matter, the suburban-central city relationship in cities with less than 50,000 people. Compare V.W.B. Inc., 8 F.C.C.2d 744
(1967) (suburban issue added) with Durgin Assocs., Inc., 10 F.C.C.2d 24 (1967) (suburban issue dismissed). In V. W.B., Inc., the FCC found Bridgeton, North Carolina
(population 15,717), to be a suburb of New Bern, North Carolina, relying on the commercial dependence of the former to the latter. 8 F.C.C.2d at 745. In the second, Gardner, Maine (6,897), was found not to be a suburb of Augusta, Maine (21,680), because
Gardner's population could and did support a separate entity. 10 F.C.C.2d at 25.
161. See Miners Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In
that case there were two mutually exclusive applicants: one for Monroeville, a borough
of more than 22,000, 3.5 miles from Pittsburgh, and the other for Ambridge-Aliquippa,
two boroughs aggregating more than 40,000 in population, 10.5 and 12 miles respectively from Pittsburgh. The Monroeville application was omnidirectional and reached a
third of Pittsburgh. Id. at 200. The Ambridge-Aliquippa application was directional
and served 98% of Pittsburgh. Applying the Huntington rationale, the FCC found that
Monroeville was a suburban service, but that Ambridge-Aliquippa was a Pittsburgh service. On the basis of first local service, Monroeville was awarded the license by the FCC.

Id.
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increasing areas of coverage to become metropolitan rather than local
stations. 162 The FCC has created a rebuttable presumption that if a
suburban station's five mv/m contour 16 3 penetrates a city with a population of 50,000 or more that is twice as large as the applicant's proposed
community of service, then the applicant intended to serve the larger
city.1 6 4 If the presumption is not rebutted, the license application will be
denied. The essential elements of a rebuttable presumption are: first, a
showing "that [the applicant's] community has separate and distinct
programming needs;'1 6 5 second, that those needs are not presently being
adequately met; 66 and third, that the applicant's proposals will adequately meet them.1 67 In addition, the applicant must introduce
evidence to show financial support through advertising from within its

community. 168
Although not necessarily determinative, the importance of the
advertising consideration is apparent. If a community's advertisers cannot support a station, the station must seek other advertisers who probably will want to reach another market. To prosper, the station is likely
to seek a broader audience to satisfy the advertisers' demands. In doing
so, the station will present programs that appeal to listeners in the larger
metropolitan area, which are not necessarily the same programs that
appeal to the suburban interests. In Miners Broadcasting Service, Inc.
69
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and
v. FCC1
The circuit court found that in Huntington the local service issue was avoided and
thus removed an unfair disadvantage from an applicant, while in Miners inequities were
created. Id. at 201. The case was remanded, requiring an explanation of the extension
of the rule that would reduce rather than increase the number of potential licensees
from which the FCC could choose. Id. at 201-02. Because Huntington furthers the public interest when used to widen inquiry does not mean that it will do so when used to
narrow interest. "We are convinced that the objective evidence of an applicant's proposed coverage, which reflects the engineering factors of ground conductivity, frequency, and power, is sufficient to raise a question as to whether the proposal will be a
realistic local transmission service for its specified community or merely another reception service." Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Consideration for Standard Broadcast
Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190, 192 (1965).
162. See also AM Station Assignment Standards, 2 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1658, 1661
(1964), discussed in Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Consideration for Standard
Broadcast Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190, 192 (1965).
163. The mv/m contour is millevolts per meter, the FCC standard measure of AM
radio signals.
164. Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast
Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190, 192-93 (1965).
165. Id. at 193.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 349 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see Woodlands Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 414
F.2d 1160, 1161 n.3 (1969). Woodland involved a situation similar to Miners. A Vidor,
Texas, applicant was disqualified by the policy statement; the license was awarded to a
Port Arthur, Texas, applicant. Port Arthur was outside the scope of the disqualifying
clause because its population exceeded 50% of Beaumont, Texas, the central city, and
the rationale of Miners was rejected in view of the policy statement. Id. at 1162-63.
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remanded an FCC extension of the Huntington Broadcasting'0 standard in such a way as to treat two suburbs of Pittsburg, Ambridge and
Aliquippe, as part of Pittsburg,"'7 while treating Monroeville, another
suburb, as a separate community. 172 The result was that the Monroeville
applicant would receive the license without considering the merit of the
173
licensee, because this was Monroeville's first AM broadcast service.
On remand the FCC responded with a Policy Statement modeled on
Huntington Broadcasting. The Policy Statement both adopted and
clarified the FCC's prior rationale. 74 The court of appeals affirmed the
75
result and approved the policy.
In Jupiter Associates, Inc. v. FCC 176 the applicant for license to
Matawan, New Jersey, asserted that the FCC Policy Statement was
improperly applied.' 77 Mutually exclusive applicants for Matawan and
Elizabeth, New Jersey, both invoked the suburban doctrine because
neither city was more than fifty percent the size of New York City and
their five mv/m signal reached the city. The court had no difficulty in
finding on the facts that Matawan clearly had a lesser programming
need.17 Accordingly, the court held that the Matawan applicant would
tend to serve the New York City metropolitan area rather than the city
of license, and Radio Elizabeth would primarily serve the programming
needs of Elizabeth, New Jersey. 179 Therefore, the award to Radio
80
Elizabeth was affirmed.
Thus, by rule making the FCC has evolved a special policy under
which both geographic distribution problems and programming needs
are initially solved by technical criteria. While technical data are relied
on, the rules recognize that in appropriate circumstances consideration
of the community's programming needs and the station's abilities will
170. 349 F.2d at 202; see note 154 supra and accompanying text; note 160 supra.
171. 349 F.2d at 200.
172. Id. at 200-01.

173. Id. at 200.
174. Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Consideration for Standard Broadcast
Facilities Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190 (1965).
175. Jupiter Associates, Inc. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The case is
similar to Miners. Appellant would have served Matawan, New Jersey, a rural borough
of a city of about 5000, 4.2 miles (three of which are over water) from New York City
with a significant nonmanufacturing business community (158 establishments). It had
other indicia of autonomy: a weekly newspaper, a court system, and an independent
government. It had no radio or television stations. The successful applicant, Radio
Elizabeth, sought a license for Elizabeth, New Jersey, a city of about 100,000 and county
seat of Union County, which had a population of approximately 500,000 and was also a
part of the New York City-northeast New Jersey metropolitan area located 14 miles from
New York City. It was a heavily industrialized and commercial city with a government.
The court set out detailed findings as to these conditions and the needs created thereby.
The court found the evidence sufficient to support the rebuttal of the presumption of

the policy statement. Id. at 111-14.
176. 420 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.at 110.
Id.
Id.at 113-14.
Id.at 114.
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outweigh the presumption that arises on technical grounds. The result is
a workable and predictable rule that relies on technical standards for
initial consideration with waiver of these standards permitted in rare circumstances.

By this approach the FCC has recognized the needs of the community for service as well as the needs of the licensee for a milieu that

both permits the exercise of journalistic discretion and allows adequate
financial returns to the licensee. 8 1 These interests are accommodated
without undue difficulty. The ability to accommodate these interests is
enhanced considerably by the lack of directly asserted interests from
representatives other than the FCC and potential licensees. Public interest assertions have complicated and cast doubt on the effectiveness of
the suburban community doctrine beyond its applicability to news and
public affairs.' 8 2 While hardly a model for other situations, the suburban community doctrine suggests that local service problems can be
solved even when they include general programming decisions. In addition, it leads to the more complex question of what programming will be
required to rebut the presumption of suburban service to a central city.
D.

Local Service Program Rules Applied to Individual Licensees
1.

From the 1960 Policy Statement to the Primer

The FCC first set forth in 1962 the basis of ascertainment
requirement, which instructs a potential licensee to determine community problems and needs, in Henry v. FCC.184 In that case, the applicant, without undertaking steps to become familiar with community
characteristics or needs, sought a permit to construct a radio station in
Elizabeth, New Jersey.1 87 The program proposals submitted to the FCC
by the applicant were identical to program proposals that its principals
had used to apply for permits in two other locations. 8 6 In its explanation of the standard by which such applications are reviewed, the FCC
stated:
It is not sufficient that the applicant will bring a first transmission service to the community-it must in fact provide a first
local outlet for community self-expression. Communities may
differ, and so may their needs; an applicant has the responsibility of ascertaining his community's needs and of program[Applicant's] principals made
ming to meet those needs ....
181. See notes 47-56 supra and accompanying text (discussing financial needs of

licensees).
182. See notes 275-314 infra (format change cases).
183. 30 F.C.C. 1021 (1961), aff'd sub nom. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
184. 302 F.2d 191, 193 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 192.
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no inquiry into the characteristics of Elizabeth or its particular
programming needs.187
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the appellant asserted that under the federal licensing scheme the
FCC was bound to issue a license to the applicant for an unserved community without regard to programming proposals if the applicant was
legally, financially, and technically qualified. 88 The court held that the
"public interest, convenience and necessity" standard of the Communications Act 8 9 provided the FCC with sufficient latitude to require programming designed to meet the needs of the community. 190
Eight years later in City of Camden'9 ' the FCC applied the rationale of Suburban Broadcasting to a proposed ownership transfer of a
Camden, New Jersey, radio station. On undisputed facts, a bifurcated
issue pertaining to community service arose: (1) was the transferee's
92
effort to determine the community's programming needs adequate,
and (2) did the transferee's programming proposals actually serve the
public interest by meeting the ascertained needs? 93 In an effort to ascertain the community's programming needs, the applicant's proposed station manager interviewed twenty persons in political and business
leadership positions. The sampling included only one black and one
woman and did not include representatives of youth groups or representatives of ethnic groups other than blacks.1 94 No effort was made by the
transferee to survey public opinion in a general way.' 9 ' Further, no
effort was made to determine the ethnic makeup of Camden,196 which
187. 30 F.C.C. at 1022 (footnotes omitted). The FCC has made clear as well that

local programming will be an important, indeed one of the most decisive, factors in
comparative hearings. Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 394

(1965). In terms of local service, the most effective FCC regulation of licensees occurs in
determining who will receive the license.
The primary reason for this is the relative lack of control by the FCC over station
transfers. Id. at 406 (Lee, Comm'r, concurring). In Powell Crosley, Jr., 11 F.C.C. 3
(1945), the FCC attempted to determine if the transferee was the best available party
and, if not, to require the transfer to be made to the best available party willing to pay
the required price. The FCC abandoned the effort, 14 Fed. Reg. 3235 (1949), and Congress legislated to prevent a return to the practice. The Act now permits the FCC to
examine only the potential transferee and the proposal for operation to determine if
minimum public interest standards are met, not whether the transferee is the most
qualified potential transferee. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1976). Significantly, the statute is not
a complete bar to an examination of a proposed transfer. See notes 327-37 infra and
accompanying text. Indeed the Communications Act specifically permits a determination of whether the transfer serves the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1976). Nevertheless, the bar is of considerable consequence, and enforcement efforts were concentrated for some time at the time of license issue.
188. 302 F.2d at 193.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id.
Id. at 194.
18 F.C.C.2d 412 (1969).
Id. at 418-19.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 415, 422.

195. Id.

196. Id.
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was approximately twenty-five percent nonwhite and over seventeen per1 97
cent foreign and first-generation Americans.
Notwithstanding that the interviews with the twenty Camden
residents indicated a feeling that the station had one deficiency, a lack
of local (South Jersey) news, 198 the program proposals manifested an
intent to reduce the time committed to local news coverage. 99 The
applicant's principals, one of whom had interviewed two persons and
listened in an unsystematic way to the local and Philadelphia stations,
proposed a "good music" format employed by several of their other stations. 20 0 All public affairs and news programs were to be reduced in
time, with local news assigned one-half hour a week compared to three
hours weekly under the transferring licensee. Foreign language programs were to be dropped without adding anything of special interest to
any ethnic group. 20'
As in Suburban Broadcasting, the proposed transferee station's programming was placed into a preconceived mold of what makes a profitable metropolitan station. The FCC had sought to avoid frustration of
the local service obligation by suburban stations using such a preconceived mold. Because of both the survey method and the proposed programming, the FCC denied transfer as against the public interest. 20 2
Thus, the Suburban Broadcastingrequirement of ascertaining the community's programming needs was complemented by requiring the potential
licensee to show an intention to meet those needs by specific programming.
The City of Camden decision is potentially important not only
because it provides a means to initiate achievement of the local service
goal, but also because it creates standards that apply to transfers of
broadcasting licenses.2 03 The most effective control, although not an
outstanding one, had been in the issuance of the original license.
Transfers have tended to undermine the impact of the original choice of
licensee. City of Camden provides a potential remedy to this deficiency
through more effective enforcement of standards imposed on license
transferees. Furthermore, the FCC attempted to define a previously vague
standard 0 4 with sufficient precision to permit its use in license application, transfer situations, and subsequent station operation appraisals.
An awareness of the community's needs emerged.
197. Id. at 413.
198. Id. at 416.
199. Id. at 417.
200. Id. at 416.
201. Id. at 417-18.
202. Id. at 424.
203. Id. at 425.
204. Primer on Ascertainment of Community. Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 27
F.C.C.2d 418, 36 Fed. Reg. 4092 (1971). See also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 53
F.C.C.2d 3 (1975); Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast
Applicants, Pt. I, §§ IV-A & IV-B of FCC Forms, 20 F.C.C.2d 880 (1969) (original
Primer on ascertainment).

65

IOWA LA WREVIEW

553

[1980]

To further the end of developing standards for the ascertainment of
community problems and needs by commercial broadcast license applicants, the FCC in early 1976 adopted a Primer0 5 in question and answer
form that requires a-broad survey of community opinion and a consultation of a list of typical community institutions and groups. 20 6 The prospective licensee must note the programs that will meet particular community needs discovered in the survey.2 0 7 The Primer is phrased in
language an intelligent person can understand. However, its language is
general and requires either interpretation by decision, or the grant of
considerable discretion to the licensee involved to act in accord with current FCC thinking, again to be derived from the trend of decisions. 20 1
2.

The Requirements of Ascertainment

The applicant for issuance or renewal of a license is required to
conduct a procedure to ascertain the problems of the proposed community of license and to suggest broadcast programs to consider these
problems. 20 9 The applicant must conduct two surveys during ascertainment: a formal survey of community leaders210 and a less formal random
survey of the community. 21 ' Initially in the process of ascertainment the
licensee is required to maintain certain demographic information on the
city of license, including population, minority representation, and
number of women. 21 2 However, the licensee need not follow this determination. The FCC list of twenty universal categories of people 21 3 to be
questioned is all that must be completed. 21 4 Communities are regarded
as so homogenous that the FCC list of twenty categories of people will
elicit needs, problems, and interests of the community. 215 Consultation
with members of these groups discharges the very important obligation
205. Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d

418 (1976), as amended by 61 F.C.C.2d 1, 1 (1976).
206. Id. at 428-29.

207. Id. "If local service does not in fact play a significant role in the operation of the
present system, traditional policies may be senseless and they may in addition turn out to
be surprisingly short of life." Renewal of Standard Broadcast and Television Licenses for
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska, 14 F.C.C.2d 2, 16 (1968).
208. See 57 F.C.C. 2d at 427-31.
209. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
Pt. I, §§ IV-A & IV-B of FCC Forms, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971) (initial application);
Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d 418
(1975) (renewal applicants).
210.
211.
212.
213.

See 27 F.C.C.2d at 881; 57 F.C.C.2d at 423-28.
See 27 F.C.C.2d at 881; 57 F.C.C.2d at 428-30.
57 F.C.C.2d at 434, 442.
The FCC has resisted efforts to add new categories to the 19 listed, but has

explicitly required that all significant groups in the applicant's community be ascertained. See Amendment of the Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Broadcast Renewal Applicants in Regard to the Community Leader Survey, 69
F.C.C.2d 1815, 1821 (1978).

214. 57 F.C.C.2d at 430, 442. Under the prior Primer, the information was used to
guide the licensee interview. See Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by
Broadcast Applicants, 20 F.C.C.2d 880, 881 (1969).
215. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
F.C.C.2d 418, 434, 442 (1976).
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of the leader survey without further regard to its scope. In conducting
this group survey, the licensee must use at least fifty percent manage2 6
ment level employees. 1
The FCC also requires a random survey of the entire community. It
need not be scientific or otherwise designed to assure coverage of all
segments of the community; 21 7 the basic requirement is that it have sufficient geographic scope to cover the service area. Its goal, like the

leader survey, is to discover the problems, needs, and interests of the

community. 218 Beyond this, total neglect of discrete groups would not be

permissible, 219 but little more of substance exists in the requirement of
the random public survey.

The problems, needs, and interests of the community are adduced
from the interviews in the survey. Program preferences may be con-

sidered, but are not to control the licensee. 220 The licensee, considering
the interviews, must program to meet the determined needs and prob-

lems, 22' including news, public affairs, and other related programming,
but generally not entertainment.

222

The decision of how to program is

within the licensee's discretion. The licensee may give greater weight to
some highly perceived problems than others, but may not neglect all
problems. 223 Moreover, the licensee is not required to propose program-

ming for minority group problems on the basis of the percentage of the
minority groups in the population of the area. 224 Indeed, as a broad

proposition, any coverage of minority problems is adequate given the
FCC's position that general programming serves minority groups. 22 5

216. Id. at 426-27, 443. Nonmanagement level employees must be supervised by
management level employees. Id. at 426-27.
217. See id. at 443; see, e.g., Montgomery Ind. Telecasters, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 262,
263 (1977); Julie P. Miner, 60 F.C.C.2d 892, 898-99 (1976); Pueblo Stereo Broadcasting
Corp., 32 F.C.C.2d 734, 738 (1971). But cf. Rocket Radio, Inc., 65 F.C.C.2d 589,
590-91 (1977) (ascertainment efforts found fatally defective).
218. 57 F.C.C.2d at 428-30, 444; see, e.g., KSD/KSD-TV, Inc., 61 F.C.C.2d 504,
506-09 (1976); Lance Communications, Inc., 57 F.C.C.2d 1235, 1236-38 (1976). The
same standard applies to the leader survey. See Alvin L. Korngold, 45 F.C.C.2d 1, 3
(1974).
219. See, e.g., Town and Country Radio, Inc., 65 F.C.C.2d 694, 697 (1977); CBS,
Inc., 57 F.C.C.2d 505, 513 (1975); Eastern Broadcasting Co., 50 F.C.C.2d 599, 600
(1975); Folkways Broadcasting Co., 48 F.C.C.2d 723, 725 (1974).
220. Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 35 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 1555, 1589 (1976); see, e.g., Lakewood Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 478
F.2d 919, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1973); A.S. Abell Co., 51 F.C.C.2d 871, 873 (1975).
221. See, e.g., Patrick Henry, 62 F.C.C.2d 293, 295 (1977); Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 61 F.C.C.2d 1, 3 (1976); Midland Broadcasters, Inc., 48 F.C.C.2d 195, 196-97 (1974).
222. See, e.g., Gulf Television Corp., 58 F.C.C.2d 228, 230 (1976); Television Wis.,
Inc., 58 F.C.C.2d 1232, 1233-1238 (1975); Bud's Broadcasting Co., 51 F.C.C.2d 238,

240 (1975).
223. Lefloore Broadcasting Co., 65 F.C.C.2d 556, 566 (1977); Southeast Ark. Radio,
Inc., 57 F.C.C.2d 351, 352 (1976); WHEC, Inc., 55 F.C.C.2d 687, 689 (1975).
224. See note 238 infra.
225. Puerto Rican Media & Educ. Council, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 1178, 1181-82 (1975);
RKO Gen., Inc., 33 F.C.C.2d 664, 668 (1972); WKBN Broadcasting Corp., 30
F.C.C.2d 958, 970 (1971).
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3. The Primer Experience
The implementation of the Primer has become the primary contemporary means of assuring local service. 226 Nevertheless, the FCC's
hesitant enforcement of the Primer's requirements has negated the
thrust of earlier decisions. 227 This has occurred because the entire scope
of ascertainment of community needs and problems is entrusted to
licensee discretion, and because unusually high pleading requirements
must be met by the challenger under section 309 of the Communications
Act. 228 The result is that few complaints reach the stage of successful
pleading, which in itself is a victory insofar as it shakes licensee complacency. A substantial number of all other challenges are lost when the
FCC finds an arguably reasonable basis for the licensee's determination
that its undertakings are adequate. 22 9 The cases provide little opportunity for the assertion and vindication of clearly felt public discontent. The
result is a gross imbalance against the public first amendment right in
favor of the licensee's business interests and first amendment right.
4.

The Primer and the FCC: A Framework of Decisions

23
Stone v. FCC230 and Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC 1
involved challenges to the means and scope of ascertainment of, and the
requisite programming to meet the community needs under, the Suburban Broadcasting and Primer rules. In Stone the renewal of WMALTV, licensed in Washington, D.C., was challenged by a group of black
community leaders. Washington has a significant black majority, but
WMAL-TV sought to provide service to the suburbs as well, which are
overwhelmingly white. The appellants' position was that the primary
obligation of the licensee was to meet the needs of the city of license, not
the needs of surrounding suburbs. 23 2 Both the method of ascertainment
of community problems and the choice of programs were challenged as
allocating too much weight to the suburban areas while neglecting the
city. 233

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed
the FCC's findings that most central cities have complex and pressing
problems requiring special attention, and that the licensee had provided
such attention. 23 4 The court held, however, that a "licensee has an
226. See Note, JudicialReview of FCC Program Diversity, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 401,

401.03 (1975).
227. See id. at 419-20.
228. See id. at 417.
229. See Western Mich. Telecasters, Inc. v. FCC, 396 F.2d 688, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
See also Southwest Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834, 837-38 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (applying Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 321-23 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
230. 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
231. 505 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
232. 466 F.2d at 325.
233. Id. at 325.
234. Id. at 327.
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obligation to meet the needs and interests of its entire area of service." 236
This is especially true in television because it has fewer stations than
radio. The court then decided that a licensee has the discretion to determine how to meet conflicting and competing regional and minority
needs within its area of service. 236 A licensee cannot disregard a strongly
expressed need, but it is not bound by a formula, such as a requirement
that time be allocated on the basis of the percentage of discrete groups
with particular needs among potential viewers. 237 The performance of
238
WMAL-TV was found to be within the required ambits.
The method of ascertaining community needs and problems was
attacked by the community leaders because it considered suburban
needs and used extravagant language to describe the station's relationship with black leadership.2 39 Consistent with FCC policy, both leaders
and the general public were questioned by the licensee to ascertain community needs. Community leaders were chosen proportionately on the
basis of the population in the District of Columbia and the surrounding
Virginia and Maryland suburbs. The representation of Washington was
doubled because it was the city of license. In addition, the balance
toward Washington was increased by a scientific survey of the city
directed at large groups and by in-depth interviews of some inner-city
residents. 240 The appellants read the renewal application survey of community leaders to state that applicants' management was in continual
daily contact with each of the interviewed black leaders. This reading
was not accepted. The court of appeals affirmed the FCC's finding that
the applicant was in fact in continuous daily contact with some of the
leaders, including all at various times, and that this was what the application meant. 241 On the basis of obligation to the city of service, this
242
was found to be proper ascertainment.
Stone raised another, more difficult question of what is to be ascertained. The FCC through its Primer and other procedures focuses on
community problems that translate into newsworthy events. 243 Thus,
235. Id.

236. Id. at 328.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. The application could be read to suggest daily contact with each of the state
leaders, stating that there was "close personal association" and "daily and continuing
activity" with the black leaders. Id. at 326-27. The court of appeals found this "perhaps
careless," but "that there was no intent . . . to deceive." Id. at 327.
240. Id. at 325-26.
241. Id. at 326-27. The protest to the use of printed forms at the interviews of community leaders was rejected. The court approved the Primer suggestion that printed
forms coull be used in conjunction with the interviews of community leaders, not as the
interviews but to structure them. Id. at 326.
242. Id. at 326-27.

243. See id. at 328 n.44. The court of appeals questioned the focus on newsworthy
events to the exclusion of other needs. The court suggested that ascertainment might
include inquiry into "the broad range of human activity that includes family life, art,
and social interaction." Id. The court concluded that the FCC is the forum for any con-

sideration of a different evaluation of programming. Id.
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while the FCC has recognized the need for special ethnic programs 244
other than news and public affairs, its policies push another way. Ethnic
groups want their culture treated in a sympathetic and thorough way in
the aggregate of programs, not neglected or relegated to an insubstantial place. 245 Aesthetic and social affairs, the aspects of many ethnic
groups that bind them together, often are forgotten because such affairs
are not problems. 246 The licensee will prefer coverage of difficulties
among ethnic and racial groups in the community over the more mundane social and cultural events. If the FCC is to pursue the local service
concept, however, it should by rule and decision include coverage of
2 47
such cultural, aesthetic, and social matters.
The importance of this concern must not be overlooked. While the
license renewal in Stone was opposed by local groups, their complaint
has national ramifications. It is not only in Washington where black
culture is slighted, nor is it only blacks who are neglected. The problem
is national, and the FCC is in a much better position to act for the
public interest than are individual groups. Articulation of standards and
enforcement of their policies will meet this need and provide a degree of
certainty to the licensee, enhancing the protection and protectability of
their interests.
While the licensee might prefer no standard and freedom to disregard public complaints, ongoing public complaint is the result of
poorly established, vague standards. Such standards are subject to continued attack by public interest groups unsatisfied with the product of
the general standards. Legal defense entails considerable expense for the
licensee. The cost of complying with firmly enforced standards might
well be less for the licensees as a group and certainly would be less for
those subject to particular attack. Likewise, if the standards were more
specific, public groups would know their rights and could vindicate
them more effectively.
The court in Stone applied the pleading requirement of the Communications Act requiring pleadings to "contain specific allegations of
fact suficient to show . . . that a grant of the application would be
prima facie inconsistent with [the public interest]." 248 The FCC's strict
application of the requirement for a prima facie case hampers efforts to
244. See Radio Akron, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 987, 994-95 (1977); Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461, 465-71 (1975); cf. Gulf Television Corp., 58 F.C.C.2d

228, 232 (1976) (proportional programming for minorities not required); Gunther
Heinrich, 27 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 211, 211-12 (1973) (FCC allowing decrease in ethnic
programming for financial reasons).
245. See Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 328 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
246. Id.; cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394-95 (1969) (dis-

cussing first amendment implications of local service).
247. The 1974 legislative proposal included this type of rule making. See H.R. 12993,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(a)(i), 2(b), 4, 6 (1974). While the language varied in the House

and Senate prints, the requirement remained basically the same.
248. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1960) (emphasis added).
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challenge incumbent licensees' local service efforts249 by creating a

burdensome task for the complainant at the commission level. Judicial
review does not ease the complainant's burden because courts will defer
to agency expertise in drawing inferences and reaching conclusions, if
reason permits. 2 0 The licensees' discretion in all steps of determining
and proposing to meet community needs renders the preparation of sufficient pleadings an exceedingly difficult task. 251 Even if the pleading
requirement is met, the matter is still fundamentally within FCC exper25 2
tise; it is difficult to elicit an affirmative response from the agency.
Although the result is salutary in protecting against frivolous complaints, it cuts too deeply. Not only are frivolous complaints excluded,
but many complaints that raise substantial questions concerning programming and general policy are lost.
Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC,25s which reiterates the

procedural position of Stone that no hearing is required if the pleading
requirements of section 309(d)(2) of the Communications Act are not
met,25 4 is a narrow case. In 1974 the coalition 255 appealed the FCC
rejection of its program complaints that public affairs were slanted
against blacks, that black music was neglected, and that news and
public affairs programming proposals were significantly decreased from
the 1967 proposals. 2 6 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the FCC decision with little elucidation. 25 7 Public
affairs, the court of appeals said, cannot be broken into black points of
view and other points of view. 258 According to the court, a mere change
in percentage of programs is not a relevant point itself since diminution
of service is a subjective public interest question, not a mathematical
question. 259 Additionally, the ascertainment of what programming is in
249. See 466 F.2d at 328-29 (deficiency of Stone pleadings discussed in context of

requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) (1960)); id. at 328 n.44 (problems facing appellant discussed in terms of FCC rules that preclude consideration of issues appellant

regarded as vital). For a survey of these issues, see note 243 supra.

250. 466 F.2d at 322; see, e.g., Civic Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1185, 1189
(D.C. Cir. 1915); Southwestern Operating Co. v. FCC, 351 F.2d 834, 835 (D.C. Cir.

1965). However, the courts will require the FCC to state the basis for its decisions to permit some minimal review. See Wait Radio, 418 F.2d 1153, 1156, 1159-60 (D.C. Cir.

1969) (remand for explanation of reasons for denial of waiver of rules). Compare West
Mich. Telecasters, Inc., 396 F.2d 688, 691-92 (D.C. Cir. 1968) with Thunder Bay
Broadcasting Corp., 49 F.C.C.2d 1023, 1027-28 (1974) (FCC interpretation of its discre-

tion in light of prior court ruling).
251. See note 267 infra and accompanying text.
252. See Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1974)

(en banc).

253. 505 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
254. Id. at 323-24.

255. The coalition consisted of individuals residing in the Columbus, Ohio, area who,
inter alia, sought to advance the interest of black residents of the Columbus area. Id. at

322.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 327-28.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 327.
Id.
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the public interest does not reach the entertainment field.
The Columbus Broadcasting Coalition decision validated the
general FCC policy of leaving programming to the discretion of the
licensee with little inquiry into service to particular groups. The court
refused to recognize the existence of a separate, black viewpoint. 260 In
doing so the court encroached on its previous Office of Communications, United Church of Christ v. FCC decision, which held that deleting
pro-integration news was contrary to the public interest because it did
not serve the needs of the large black population in and surrounding
Jackson, Mississippi.2 61 In Columbus Broadcasting Coalition the existence of a black view was rejected.26 2 Equally important, the court did
not act on its suggestion in Stone (and the logic of the format change
cases) that interests often subsumed in the entertainment category are
highly important.2 63 Columbia Broadcasting Coalitionlimited Stone and
essentially left supervision of licensee community service to the FCC,
with little effective
which in turn delegates that function to the licensee,
2 4
concern for the position of diverse public groups.
FCC decisions before and after Stone have resulted in a situation in
which the licensee's ascertainment of community problems has supplanted program evaluation as the primary basis for determining
whether the locality is served by the licensee. This approach is based on
the assumption that once the problems of a community are disclosed,
the licensee will program to meet these problems. Articulation of this
proposition is much less difficult than its proof. Indeed, what proof
there is indicates a contrary result.2 65 The large number of programming complaint cases coupled with ascertainment complaints indicate
that those petitioning the FCC do not believe they are served. It has
been demonstrated that meeting the public service obligation is financially feasible in some of these cases, and financial infeasibility has not
been shown in most. Similarly, it has not been shown that the policy
impinges on journalistic independence. Indeed, these matters are simply
not discussed by the FCC in a significant manner. Thus, to challenge
2 66
programming, the process of ascertainment must be challenged.
5.

Ascertainment Under the Primer: A Critique

Beyond pro forma ascertainment, the FCC Primer requirements
promote an ongoing dialogue between the licensee and the residents of
260. Id.
261, 359 F.2d 994, 1008-09 (D.C. Cir. 1966), rev'd on rehearing, 425 F.2d 543, 550
(D.C. Cir. 1969), discussed in notes 265-70 infra.
262, 505 F.2d at 327.

263. See id.
264. See notes 177-200 supra (discussing implications of format change cases).
265. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57
F.C.C.2d 418, 422, 460 (1976).
266. But see id. at 460-62 (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
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the licensee's service area. Ascertainment should be a continuing process. 267 The public should be involved in the decisions of licensees, but

only to a limited extent. An agreement to consult the public or to establish
an advisory council is acceptable; 26 8 an agreement to program a particular position of time or to subject decisions to approval of a citizens'
committee is not acceptable. 26 9 The licensee may not bargain away its
control of programming to further its public interest obligation. 270 This
FCC position is correct, but it is neither fully consistent with other
licensee practices nor sufficiently supported by FCC willingness to
271
enforce the desired dialogue.
In fact, many licensees delegate control of their programming to
networks and thereby frustrate service to local groups, despite the fact
that this delegation is prohibited. 272 The relative neglect of certain local
groups and deference to network programming reflect reality. The
substantial local demand for the programs of reasonably high quality
provided by the networks is fulfilled. In addition, network affiliation
and the use of network programming is profitable. Whether permitted
by formal agreement or not, the licensee will pursue the course of action
that is lucrative to the exclusion of the less lucrative. Accordingly, network programming will be preferred, and programming for local needs
will be limited to the minimum necessary to buffer the noisome complaints. This can be altered only by the FCC aligning itself with the
complainants and forcing further notice of them.
The ascertainment process is of limited value. The great reliance on
licensee discretion cloaks the licensee in a series of strong, but not irrebuttable, presumptions. The pleading rules of unusually high specificity
and materiality requirements reinforce this protection. Likewise, the
assumption that most program mixes are satisfactory hampers the effec267. See, e.g., Formulation of Rules and Policies Relating to the Renewal of Broadcast Licenses, 43 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1973); The Outlet Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 355, 367 (1972);

Amendment of Section IV of Broadcast Application Forms, 5 F.C.C.2d 175, 178 (1966).
The requirement of continual ascertainment has thwarted attacks on license renewals
by allowing the applicant to upgrade its application. See Eastern Broadcasting Co., 55
F.C.C.2d 276, 276 (1975); Roy H. Park Broadcasting of Va., Inc., 54 F.C.C.2d 995, 997
(1975); The Outlet Co., 38 F.C.C.2d 355, 367 (1972).
268. See Public Communications, Inc., 49 F.C.C.2d 988, 989 (1974); BobJones Univ.,
Inc., 32 F.C.C.2d 781, 781-82 (1971). See also Agreements Between Broadcast Licensees
and the Public, 57 F.C.C.2d 42, 42 (1975).
269. See RKO Gen., Inc., 42 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1077 (1973), reconsiderationdismissed

as moot, 44 F.C.C.2d 1004 (1974), vacated as moot sub nom. Boston Community Media
Comm. v. FCC, 509 F.2d 516 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam).

270. This requirement permits the licensee to enter into an agreement and not comply with it or to enter into an agreement that would be unacceptable to the FCC as a
licensee proposal. Cf. KCOP Television, Inc., 62 F.C.C.2d 93, 94 (1976) (licensee's

failure to comply with agreement accepted by FCC).
271. Agreement Between Broadcast Licensees and the Public, 57 F.C.C.2d 42, 44

(1975); Mission Cent. Co., 54 F.C.C.2d 581, 583 (1975); Intercontinental Radio, Inc.,
53 F.C.C.2d 1171, 1173 (1975); Great W. Broadcasting Corp., 53 F.C.C.2d 1147, 1154
(1975).
272. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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tiveness of the process. The important exclusion of consideration of
community interests and of entertainment programming results in considerable dilution of the policy's impact. Still, the undertaking has some
virtue. The most laggard licensee must do something to make a gesture
towards serving the public interest. Problems are discovered and some
response probably occurs. The simple exposure to community feelings
and views is further enhanced by the active complaint process, 273 which
doubtless results in some small victories. The response, however, is
limited and the value of the focus on individual licensees dubious.
The bulk of television programming is, after all, network fare. The
same is not currently true of radio. If this reality were faced, some
modification of programming would be more likely. Even as structured,
programming could be affected beneficially if the interests of the community were considered, if the programming were required to be directly
linked to problems, needs, and interests, and if a recognition emerged
that minority concerns should be treated as matters of some urgency,
distinct from general programming but not so distinct as to subsume all
programming. The ascertainment process needs a clearer focus and a
more determined implementation through program performance
scrutiny by the FCC.
E. The Format Change Cases
1.

Introduction: The General Principles

The format change or transfer cases 27 4 have established the principle that the public obligation interest requires, if feasible, a program
format that accommodates all major aspects of contemporary culture
within the broadcast service area. Once established, such service may
not be changed or abandoned when a broadcasting license is transferred. While the general proposition would seem to apply to all licensees,
the FCC has not acted against incumbent licensees who change their
programming format, but have no intention to transfer their broadcasting licenses. Rather than evaluate the licensee when the format
change occurs, this becomes one factor considered by the FCC at the
time of license renewal. 275 This approach is deficient in two particular
aspects. A format change that is consistent with the public interest will
persist until the time of license renewal. Additionally, at license renewal
the FCC is disinclined to subject the individual licensee, seeking renewal
with a large number of other licensees, to scrutiny.2 76
273. See Canbry, Programmingin Response to the Community: The Broadcast Consumer and the First Amendment, 55 TFX. L. REv. 67, 87 (1976).
274. See text accompanying notes 282-314 infra.
275. E.g., Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 41 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 979, 980 (1977);
Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 66 F.C.C.2d 78, 85 (1977); Southern
Broadcasting Co., 57 F.C.C.2d 891, 895 (1976).
276. See Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 4 (1968).
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The result is that licensee format changes are excluded from serious
and effective review by the FCC. This is an indefensible policy. 27 7 A
fairness doctrine complaint, which alleges unfair coverage of a controversial issue of public importance, receives immediate FCC consideration, 278 even though it requires extensive intervention in programming.
Additionally, a format change is considered prior to transfer of a broadcasting license. 27 9 Thus, practices that are analogous in theory are
treated differently. When the public interest is damaged by an incumbent format change, it is tolerated; when an incumbent violates the
fairness doctrine and thus infringes on the public interest, or when a
change in programming format is incidental to a change in ownership of
the licensee, the matter is immediately considered. Incumbent changes
should receive the same treatment.
The result and rationale of the transfer cases are significant
nonetheless. Program consideration is practical and is sometimes
required by the Communications Act. 2 80 The feasibility of program consideration is established on two showings: (1) the FCC is required to consider not only the city of assignment, but also the entire metropolitan
area; 28 1 (2) recognizing the fundamental concern of the licensee, the
FCC must determine whether the format is financially viable.
2.

The Cases and the Principles

In Citizens Committee v. FCC282 the licensee proposed to transfer
his license of a station with the only classical music format in Atlanta to
a transferee who would have adopted a popular-light classical music format.2 8 3 In explanation of the transfer the licensee asserted, and the FCC
accepted, that it was not financially feasible to continue the operation of
a classical music format. 28 4 The court required an examination of this
aspect of the decision in light of substantial capital expenditures in the
early part of the relevant six-year period, thereby raising the accounting
practice problems. 2 5 In Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v.
277. This position is linked to the importance of the service to the public and the total

use and availability of a sufficient number of stations to permit distinct formats. Early
network radio, like television today, was largely interchangeable. See Hartford Communications Comm. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

278. See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public
Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 18 (1974).
279. This issue is present in all cases discussed in this section. See Citizens Comm. to
Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Comm. to Preserve
Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1973); notes 346, 388 infra and
accompanying text.
280. For transfer of format changes, see 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1976), construed in
WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1404, 1408 (1979).

281. See notes 160-75 supra and accompanying text.

282.
283.
284.
285.

436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 269-70.
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the court required reconsideration of a proposed transfer from
unique hard rock formats that were becoming profitable to "middle of
the road music." 28 7 The transfer involved a suburban station that served
the Toledo, Ohio, metropolitan area, an area served by multiple
licensees. 28 In Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC 28 9 the court
required a reconsideration of whether a classical music station operated
by Zenith Radio Corporation in Chicago could be transferred to a proposed licensee that would have adopted a contemporary or "rock music"
format. 290 Like Toledo, Chicago had multiple licensees. 2 91 Similarly, the
292
format was arguably unique, at least as to metropolitan-wide service.
Zenith used accounting practices that fully considered the promotional
and technical development benefits from the station accruing to
Zenith. 293 In Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC294 a Denver
licensee of an all-news station proposed a format change to "country and
western" music format. 29 Like the Toledo and Chicago cases, there
were multiple licensees and the all-news format was unique. 296 However,
the financial loss was clearly real; accordingly the court affirmed the
297
FCC decision permitting format change.
After these holdings, the FCC has an affirmative obligation to
establish that a reasonable substitution for the terminated format exists,
if the change is to be permitted. 298 Finally, the FCC has been required
to establish that the format is not unique. "Top Forty" stations playing
some hard rock are not hard rock equivalents, 299 nor is an apparent fine
arts station that presents classical music along with other cultural
material the equivalent of a classical music station? 00 While these matters seem obvious, they tend to elude the FCC. In applying these standards, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has forced the
FCC to analyze the facts-an undertaking the FCC has not shouldered
gladly-while permitting it to draw reasonable inferences from the
analyzed facts.
In sum, the FCC effort to disregard the facts, and its clear effort to
benefit incumbent licensees to the disadvantage of the public have been
286. 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
287. Id. at 928.

288. Id.
289. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
290. Id. at 249.
291. Id. at 249-50.
292. Id. at 262-63 (rehearing en banc 1974).
293. Id. at 265.
294. 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
295. Id. at 922.
296. Id. at 921.
297. Id. at 925.
298. Compare Lakewood Broadcasting, 478 F.2d 919, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1973) with
notes 267-68 supra and accompanying text.
299. See 478 F.2d at 932.
300. See 506 F.2d at 264-65.
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firmly rejected in these cases. 3 0 1 Morever, court decisions have forced a
recasting of the requirement under section 309 of the Communications
Act of pleading specific facts material to the public interest in format
change cases. Thus, if the FCC is unable for any reason to find that the
public interest would be served by the transfer on the basis of the application, pleadings, and officially noticeable matters, it must extinguish
30 2
the doubt or deny the transfer.
The rigorous analysis of the format change cases has been carried
still further. It has weakened the concept of the suburban community
303
under section 307(b) of the Communications Act in the radio context.
Just as Stone established the service obligation for central city television
stations to their suburbs, the format change cases have established the
relevance of all radio services of a metropolitan area in considering any
one licensee's service to the entire area. Thus, in Citizens Committee v.
FCCs °4 a Decatur licensee was considered in making a determination of
service to Atlanta, in apparent contradiction to the earlier position that
30 5
suburban stations should serve their suburbs, not their central cities.
And, in Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC30 6 the
FCC considered a Sylvania, Ohio, licensee in determining service to
Toledo, Ohio. Finally, in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC30 7
the court held that the public interest required consideration of the
entire service area in format change cases.3 0 8 While these cases dealt
with entertainment formats rather than news, public affairs, and other
features on which the FCC had placed emphasis in the Suburban Community cases, the rationale applies to all situations. While suburban
communities have some separate news and public affairs interests, it is
anomalous to suggest that suburbs do not share a common interest in
their center city, and/or in a metropolitan area with other suburbs and
the central city.
3.

What the Cases Demonstrate: An Interim Conclusion

In reaching the format change results, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has relied on the virtue of diversity in broadcasting
to justify its position.3 0 9 This is assuredly important, and the cases further the goal of diversity. More importantly, however, the cases require
301. See note 298 supra.
302. See 506 F.2d at 258-59.
303. See notes 175, 180, 274-302 supra and accompanying text; notes 304-67 infra
and accompanying text.
304. 436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
305. Id. at 267, 271-72.
306. 478 F.2d 926, 927-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
307. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
308. Id. at 263.
309. See Note, JudicialReview of FCC ProgramDiversity Regulation, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 401, 419-34 (1975).
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that ascertained broadcasting interests of a segment of the population of
a metropolitan area must benefit from the diversity. In doing so, the
decisions have recognized that it is people, not a locality, that require

service.3 10 When service to the public and not to a geographic locality
is recognized as paramount, the geographic locality is properly cast as a
convenient, effective, and proper means to allocate broadcasting frequencies."1 ' While residence in a particular locality is an indicator of
certain concerns, basically concerns about local news and to some extent
public affairs, such a residence is not determinative of all programming

needs. However, entertainment and cultural interests depend less on a
local basis. Interest in classical music or hard rock is not limited to one
area, nor is interest in black culture or the social condition of women so
limited. The same is true of other ethnic groups and devotees of all types

of entertainment and culture, no matter how popular or obscure.
Excepting some news and some public affairs, most interests are not
functions of geographic location. Efforts to promote local service on the
basis of geography rather than public interests do not further the goal of
fulfilling the desires implicit in the public interest criterion.
The format change cases clearly illustrate a flawed FCC view of the
policy necessary to implement its mandate. The effort to avoid the
statutory requirement of consideration of format changes at license
transfer is a neglect of important means of achieving proper service to
the public. Seldom has the bias of an administrative agency toward the
status quo and the interests of those it regulates, rather than fidelity to it
statutory mandate, been clearer. 31 2 Still, the court of appeals has been
restrained in its response. The FCC decision to consider format changes
310. In the Citizens Committee case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

Circuit observed that
[t]he "public interest, convenience, and necessity" can be served in the one
case [when there are 20 radio channels] in a way that it cannot be in the other
[where there is one radio channel], since it is surely in the public interest, as
that was conceived of by a Congress representative of all the people, for all
major aspects of contemporary culture to be accommodated by the commonly
owned public resources whenever that is technically and economically feasible.
436 F.2d 263, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1970), quoted in Citizens Committee to Save WEFM, 506
F.2d 246, 260-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
311. See notes 127-31 supra and accompanying text.
312. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed: "We suspect, not altogether facetiously, that the Commission would be more than willing to
limit the precedential effect of Citizens Committee to cases involving Atlanta classical
music stations." Citizens Comm. to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926, 930
(D.C. Cir. 1973), quoted in Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 260
n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see WCWN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1404, 1411-17 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (requiring FCC consideration of format changes at transfer and renewal and strongly criticizing FCC actions in format change cases). The court
observed:
Throughout the format controversy, the Commission has displayed a deepseated aversion to the decisions of this court . . . while at the same time
misinterpreting and exaggerating their meaning . . . . And [the FCC] instituted the present proceeding in the nature of rule making with the apparent
purpose of overruling the WEFM case'. Whatever [the FCC's] power generally
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made by licensees during the term of their license at the time of license
renewal, as one aspect of the agency's overview of programming evaluation, is dubious and distressing. 313 Almost certainly, the issue will never
emerge; FCC patterns of action and administrative law concepts of
expertise, discretion, and scope of review will bar inquiry. Nor is it likely
that the knowledge of FCC deficiency will be applied in other situations.
Again, administrative law doctrines largely will preclude review. The
FCC is given the primary mandate to execute the Communications Act,
and Congress
has accepted the agency's role and acquiesced in its per4
31

formance.

4.

The FCC Response to the Cases

Following Citizens Committee to Save WEFM, the FCC issued
notice of hearing 3 5 and an opinion and order indicating that the FCC
would not follow the format change cases. 31 6 The order lwas stayed31 7 for
sixty days or until the outcome of litigation challenging the FCC position.3 18 The FCC challenged the court of appeals by relying on several
theories. First, a series of administrative complexities would arise31 9 from

the problems of determining what constituted a particular format; thus,
changes in musical taste or the broadcasting of classical music from different eras would create difficulties in decisionmaking.3 20 Second, first
amendment considerations are implicated by the FCC supervision of
program content involved in considering format changes.3 21 Third, the
3 22
legislative history is against the interpretation of the court of appeals.
The FCC correctly identified the problem in the first two instances, but it
failed in the third; the FCC attempted to resolve its distaste for format
change authority, but it searched for an answer and found none.
to proceed by rule making rather than adjudication, we think it a somewhat
different matter when the seeming purpose... is the circumvention of a recent

court decision ....
Id. at 1414-15.
313. See note 273 supra and accompanying text.

314. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 796
(1978). The Court is highly critical of the lower court's reading-which was contrary to
the FCC's reading-of the Communications Act, the first amendment, and FCC policy
in National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 963 (D.C. Cir.
1977). The Court overruled the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and affirmed the

FCC rules set forth in its Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, reconsidered, 53
F.C.C.2d 589 (1975), concerning licensee ownership of daily newspapers. 436 U.S. at
792. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1978) (court-agency relationship).

315. Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast
Stations, 57 F.C.C.2d 580, 580 (1975).
316. Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast
Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 865-66 (1976).
317. Id. at 866.
318. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1405 (1979).
319. Id. at 861-65.
320. Id. at 862.
321. Id. at 859-61, 865-66.
322. Id. at 859-62.
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Because the Communications Act requires consideration of transfer format changes, the FCC must seek an answer that facilitates such consideration.
The answer is fundamental to administrative law: establish stan-

dards by rule making or decisions and follow them.3 23 The makeup of a
format is complex. It involves nuances of personality of on-the-air
talent,3 2 4 trends in music,325 and other issues of format classification.32
The best method to resolve these questions is by rule making that
recognizes that the format classification cannot be perfect, but can iden-

failing that, by common law
tify the salient issues to be considered,3237 2or
8
analysis and development of standards.
Sensitive rule making is required when the first amendment is

implicated. Those who argue for format change control cite the paramount public interest language of Red Lion. Those who object empha3 29
size the concern for journalistic discretion in Columbia Broadcasting.
If Columbia Broadcasting is thus relied on, then Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo033 must be briefly considered to emphasize
the scope of the opinions. Tornillo rejected legislation mandating replies
to critical remarks about political candidates in newspapers. Though
analogous to the rules in Red Lion, Tornillo extended broader first
amendment protection to the print media. Red Lion, like every other
Supreme Court case on the issue, recognized that appropriate regulation
of content by the FCC is permissible under the first amendment because
of the unique nature of the electronic media, 33 a characteristic shared
with all other broadcasting media, notably motion pictures332 and sound
tracks.93 3 Regulation not appropriate for newspaper under the first
amendment is appropriate to other media.
323. See Friendly, The FederalAdministrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1064 (1962).
324. Development of Policy re: Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast
Stations, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 862 (1976).
325. Id.
326. E.g., Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 41 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 979, 986-88 (1977);
Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, 66 F.C.C.2d 78, 85 (1977); Southern
Broadcasting Co., 57 F.C.C.2d 891, 895 (1976).
327. Compare SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92-93 (1943) (suggesting preference for rule making) with SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-04 (1947) (accepting use of adjudication when rule making was available).
328. This common-law development of standards has occurred in many areas of the
law, most notably in labor law adjudication. Compare NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,
394 U.S. 759, 762-66 (1969) (suggesting disapproval of consistent NLRB use of adjudication when rule making was available) with NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267,
290-95 (1974) (accepting continued use of adjudication by NLRB).
329. 412 U.S. 94, 124-25 (1973).
330. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
331. 395 U.S. 367, 386-87, 389-95 (1969).
332. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1952).
333. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97-98 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring). While the
case did not produce a majority opinion, it has been generally cited for this view. See
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387 (1969).
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Nor is this media variance standard applied to the electronic media
alone. Censorship with close scrutiny of procedural safeguards is permitted for motion pictures,3 34 but not for the print media; 335 and time,
place, and name standards are more strict for the sound track336 than the
press 337 or motion pictures. 338 Nor does Columbia Broadcastingundermine format supervision. The court of appeals was not reversed because
of its state action views 339 or because of fundamental first amendment rights.3 40 Rather, the court was reversed because of the lack of
either legislative mandate or proposed workable rule. 34 ' Had Congress
or the FCC promulgated an appropriate standard for licensee conduct,
3 42
the standard might have survived scrutiny.
The standard suggested by the decisions rendered in favor of the
FCC is one of general scope that does not directly control programming.
The fairness doctrine, which requires fair coverage of controversial
issues of public importance, and the equal opportunity doctrine, which
requires licensees to make time available to all political candidates for a
particular office on equal terms, are such standards. In the area of
objectionable programming, such as obscenity, the general programming guidance of the FCC has been approved.3 43 Two early cases, Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FederalRadio Commission,344 involving
the use of a station to present a single religious viewpoint, and KFKB
BroadcastingAssociation v. FederalRadio Commission,345 involving the
use of a station to further the licensee's fraudulent scheme of sale of
prescription drugs,3 46 looked at program content by approaching format
in a general sense and rejected license applications. And, in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation347 the Supreme Court rejected prior censorship, but
specifically endorsed subsequent review of program content. 348 The
Court also rejected a system of rigid supervision approaching censorship.3 49 Accordingly, the proper course is one of general guidance set by
rules establishing a framework in which problems can be addressed by
adjudication and further rulemaking.
334. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-60 (1965).
335. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-16 (1931).
336. See note 333 supra.
337. See notes 330, 335 supra.
338. See note 334 supra.
339. Only three justices held that there was no state action. 412 U.S. at 114-21; see
id. at 171 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing division in Court).
340. Id. at 121-32.
341. Id. at 122-31.
342. Id.
343. Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850, 852-53
(D.C. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933).
344. Id.
345. 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
346. Id. at 671-72.
347. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
348. Id. at 735-38.
349. See id.
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In WCWN Listener's Guild v. FCC35 0 the court of appeals rejected'
the FCC effort to treat the format change cases as the FCC wished
rather than as the court decisions required. 351 The court made clear
that the public interest, convenience, and necessity standard of the
Communications Act required consideration of format changes when a
license is either transferred or renewed.3 52 The court emphasized that a
hearing to determine whether a format change or transfer was warranted was required when four factors occurred: (1) there is significant
"grumbling" by a significant portion of the population of the locality
served; 35 3 (2) there are multiple broadcast licensees in the locality; 3 4 (3)
the abandoned format is unique; 355 and (4) the abandoned format is
35 6
financially viable.
The court clearly indicated that the FCC had a role in the
355
court/agency partnership.3 57 The FCC could define formats broadly,
3 59
evaluate the degree of grumbling,
and set standards for financial
viability.3 60 The FCC could not, however, disregard the statutory mandate as interpreted by the court of appeals. 36 ' Problems of administrative complexity could not be incorporated when they did not exist 362 (as
the court demonstrated in WCWN). 3 63 Likewise, the court's insistence
on general supervision of format could not be read as a particular
scrutiny of programs to amount to unconstitutional censorship or some
other violation of first amendment rights. The WCWN decision makes
clear that people are to be served under the public interest standard.
While the court gave the FCC appropriate flexibility, it required a
fidelity to the statutory mandate the FCC had attempted to avoid.
The problem of public benefit and detriment from maintaining or
abandoning a particular format has an easy solution. The FCC must
look at the market, the information from the market, and its own
developed information and apply its good faith discretion.3 65 The course
thereafter is also clear. The format change cases emphasize that multiple outlets do not assure diversity.3 66 Under the present statutory
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1420.
Id. at 1407.
See id.at 1408.
See id.

355. See id.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id.at 1407-08.
See id.at 1417.
Id. at 1418-19.
Id. at 1419.

360. See id.
361. Id. at 1414-15, 1420.

362. Id.at 1413-14.
363. Id. at 1414.

364. Id. at 1419.
365. Id.at 1421-22.
366. See notes 282-314 supra and accompanying text.
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scheme, format changes must be supervised.3 67 The FCC, the junior
partner in the court/agency hierarchy, has its marching order. Instead
of attempting to avoid the court's mandate, the FCC must follow that
mandate, whether the FCC wishes to or not. The reluctance to act here
is amply illustrative of why the FCC does not establish and implement
policy well.
The Regulation of Networks

F.
1.

Introduction: Of Rules and Local Service

The 1927 Radio Act included provisions indicating Congress
recognized that network radio broadcasting had begun; the scope of
radio and television network influence since has expanded vastly. While
rules limiting multiple ownership of licensees prevent an aggregation of
national broadcast power outside the networks,3 68 nothing effective has
been done to counteract network power. Because the networks or other
national effort are the only entity capable of providing the service
desired by the public and by advertisers, such an eclectic response to the
realities of broadcasting3 6 9 was a near certainty. The result of ineffectively restrained network power is a loss of local service in the sense of
both the use of standard national programs and the removal of decisions
concerning programming from local to national decisionmakers.
2.

Network Affiliate Rules

A major source of actual, largely unexercised, local power over programming in network television and radio are the FCC rules governing
the relationship of networks and their affiliated stations.37 0 The network
367. See notes 313-14 supra and accompanying text.
368. Beyond networking, the associated problem of concentration of ownership that
may impair local service has been addressed, but in a way of limited effectiveness. Multiple ownership of broadcast facilities are limited to seven AM, 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(b)
(1978), seven FM, id. § 73.240(a)(2); and seven television, of which five may be VHF, id.
§ 73.636(a)(2). In a particular market, ownership is limited to one license in each service. Id. Cross ownership of print and broadcast media is also prohibited in certain
situations. See id. § 73.636(c). Such action is necessary if control is to be decentralized.
However, this policy has not been marked by unusual zeal or even sustained serious
attention. Thus, after the cause c~l~bre of the WHDH case, rule making' was instituted
concerning cross ownership. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 12-13 (1969). This took five
years to complete, even though the issue had coalesced over 15 years earlier. Likewise, reinforcement of the duopoly rules has been marked by delay. See Amendment of
Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970),
modified, 28 F.C.C.2d 662 (1971), modfied, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975). The rules
originally would have banned ownership of two broadcast stations in any market. 22
F.C.C.2d at 306. They ultimately banned only VHF television and AM radio ownership
in the same market. 50 F.C.C.2d at 1047.
369. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, supra note 4, at 58-60.
370. In NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the Court discussed the FCC
regulations on chain broadcasting. Id. at 193-98. The rules are discussed in notes 373-74
infra and accompanying text.
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affiliate rules were promulgated in the early 1940s during one of the
periods of FCC concern with supposed excessive network dominance of,
broadcasting. 371 Because the Communications Act does not provide for
direct regulation of networks, 372 the network affiliate rules prohibit
certain licensee contract provisions. The rules in current form forbid
contracts that do not permit a station to broadcast programs of other
networks3 "3 or that do not permit the network to provide programs
rejected by an affiliate to other stations in the particular market. 374
Two particular problems -network ownership of large numbers of
stations and operation of more than one network by one company-were solved by the FCC study and rule making. Networks were
forbidden to own two stations serving one area 3 "5 or to operate more
than one network. 376 In NBC v. United States377 the Supreme Court
upheld the substance of the network affiliate rules as consistent with the
public interest criteria of the Communications Act 378 and, in an aggregate consideration of other parts of the Act, endorsed the rationale
underlying the rules. 37 9 The Court made clear that the FCC has the
authority to redress the imbalance between the networks and network
affiliates, to expand service generally to listeners, and to promote local
3 0
service.
By a series of examples cited by the court in NBC, the FCC
established elements that constitute a failure of service to the local community. 381 Interestingly, the FCC included the restriction of network
programs by exclusive affiliate contracts. 382 The Court cited the FCC
example of the 1939 World Series broadcast by the Mutual Network;
National Broadcasting Company and Columbia Broadcasting System
affiliates could not carry the broadcast under the terms of their affiliate
contracts. 38 3 This example illustrated the harm arising from a network
affiliation contract that forbade an affiliate of one network from carrying programs of another network. 384 The Court did not address the
question of whether the public interest mandated the particular programs. Rather, the FCC's findings were upheld because the restriction
on the licensee's choice of the programs they deemed best suited to their
locality's needs, illustrated by the FCC examples cited by the Court,
371.

See B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 131 (1976).

372. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).

373. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.132 (1978).
374. Id.
375. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 208 (1943).

376. See id.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

319
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S. 190 (1943).
at 215-18.
at 216.
at 218.
id. at 198-208 (brief discussion of FCC examples).
at 198-200.
at 199.
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violated the public interest obligation imposed on the licensees by the
Communications Act. 388 Likewise, under the existing contracts estab-

lishing a network affiliation, the network, in exchange for granting an
exclusive right to all network programming, received a right, known as
option time, to require the affiliate to carry a certain amount of the network's programs at specified times. Programs not covered by this option
time and rejected by an affiliate granted this exclusive right were not
available in the locality of the particular affiliate. The court approved
the FCC's finding that the resulting inability of listeners to receive a pro386
gram rejected by such an affiliate was contrary to the public interest.
The Court specifically related the option time right to local programming needs. The FCC had found that when large amounts of time
were required by the networks as option time the quality of nonnetwork programs was impaired. The Court accepted the FCC's finding
that "[1]ocal program service is a vital part of community life.

'38

To

achieve local service, the Court held that freedom from the control of
excessive option time by networks was essential. The Court also
approved the FCC finding that a contractual and practical right to
reject programs must exist in the licensee vis-a-vis both networks and
advertisers. The court stated: "The licensee has the duty of determining
what programs shall be broadcast over his station's facilities, and cannot
lawfully delegate the duty or transfer the control of his station directly to
the network or indirectly to an advertising agency." 389 Accordingly, the
Court approved the FCC's determination that a licensee must exercise its
reasoned discretion0 as to which programs are satisfactory for its audi39
ence and locality.
The Court's discussion of the FCC's rule making manifests three
important values. Broadcasters are to be compelled by the rules to provide listeners and viewers access to the type of programs the listeners and
viewers desire. This value is forwarded by promoting diversity of program presentation without regard to source. Second, local service vital
to community life, especially in the form of locally produced programs,
is to be encouraged. Finally, the licensee is to be protected and encouraged in its duty to act independently from the network and other external controls. Undoubtedly, FCC's network affiliate rules have had some
impact. Since their initial challenge, however, the rules have not been
subject to litigation.
385. Id. at 190-99.
386. This conclusion was supported by the example of Buffalo, New York, where the

exclusive Mutual Network affiliate rejected the lauded "American Forum of the Air,"
and no other station could carry it because of the contract between Mutual and its affiliate. See id.
387. Id. at 203.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
390. Id. at 206.
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On occasion, massive refusals by affiliates to approve the airing of
programs have occurred A9 These instances, however, were rooted in
national political controversy, and the viewers who wished to view the
programs (including viewers of stations willing to clear them) were
deprived of the privilege. No doubt the network affiliate rules have some
marginal impact: the rules encourage diversity and local programming
and counterbalance network power pressing on the individual licensee.
The impact of the FCC is low profile, slight, and certainly not significant in developing either a marked diversity of programming or large
amounts of local programming.
3.

The Prime Time Access Rule

The latest addition to the network affiliate rule structure is the
prime time access rule (PTAR) for television, 39 2 which requires that no
more than three hours of the prime time period be devoted to network
programming in the top fifty markets. 39 3 The primary goal of the FCC
was to promote a high quality syndication 394 of programs. 395 Greater
syndication would result because the local stations would need to purchase programs for the time freed by PTAR; syndicated programs are a
logical choice for this free programming slot. A secondary goal was to
encourage local service. The licensee could choose local programs for
the time freed by PTAR. Finally, it was hoped that the networks would
continue to program four hours for the smaller markets, and that support of network programs by independents in the larger market would
aid the independents and promote diversity. 396 Since PTAR applies only
to licensees in the top fifty markets, the networks might have programmed (but in fact did not) for other markets and nonaffiliated stations in
the top fifty markets. A direct result of more local news or more locally
originated programs was not the primary original goal of PTAR. 397
Notwithstanding that it was not an FCC goal to increase the
amount of local news or locally originated programs, the diversity permitted by syndication should have that effect. PTAR frees one of the
391. See, e.g., BROADCASTING, March 12, 1973, at 27; id., April 14, 1969, at 50-51.
392. Prime Time is 7:00-11:00 p.m., except in the central time zone where it is
6:00-10:00 p.m.
393. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With Respect
to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, 23 F.C.C.2d
382, 394-96 (1970), aff'd sub nom. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470,
476-88 (2d Cir. 1971).
394. Syndication of programs means the sale of programs to stations. The programs
are provided on video tape or film and may be used at any time by the station. While
the syndication provides programs like a network, the time of presentation is not
affected by the syndication, nor is there an ongoing relationship between one syndication and a licensee.
395. 23 F.C.C.2d at 397.
396. Id.
397. PTAR I nowhere discusses such programming as a primary goal, and it is thus
apparent that it was not. Id. at 382 passim.
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four prime time hours for use as the licensee wishes. If the theory of the
local service doctrine is correct, local stations could program for their
audiences by a choice of locally produced programs or by an increased
use of syndicated programming appropriate to their local communities.
The initial results were not mixed. After a year in which off-network
reruns were permitted and predominated, the fare shifted from locally
produced programs to syndications of "stripped" game shows,398 broken
by some marked expansion in local origination of service by news and
other programs, and a handful of other programs. General complaints
increased, 399 although the broadcast industry and others were divided in
their support and opposition to the rules. 40 0 The initial goal of the FCC
was frustrated.
FCC frustration, substantial industry unhappiness, and some public
feeling that poorer programs followed PTAR resulted in the FCC's promulgation of a modified rule. 40 1 The second rule making was overturned
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit because of procedural
40 3
irregularities. 402 A third rule making was delayed, but is now in force.
The new rules, PTAR III, recognize local service as a goal404 and protect the viewing public's interest in certain kinds of programs, even
though such programs may not be local 405 (notably children's programs,
406
While the
public affairs programs, or documentary programs).
substance of PTAR was not greatly changed in its third form, the FCC
discovered new justification, including a strong emphasis on local service. While not operative, 40 7 the -rules proposed in PTAR II warrant
discussion because their substance is the type necessary if there is to be
local programming service.
Not only was local service to be promoted by PTAR II, but industry
discontent was to be alleviated. Substantial concessions to the networks
398. See Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the Prime Time
Access Rule, § 75.658(k) of the Commission's Rules, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 877 (1975).

"Stripped" programming is presented five or more times a week in a certain time slot,
instead of the normal one day per week.
399. See id. at 831.
400. Id. at 831-32.
401. Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the "Prime Time
Access Rule," Section 73.658(k), of the Commission's Rules, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081, 1148-49
(1974).
402. National Ass'n Ind. Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249, 255,
257-58 (2d Cir. 1974).
403. Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the Prime Time
Access Rule, § 73.658(k) of the Commission's Rules, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 853 (1975).
404. Id. at 835, 843-44.
405. Id. at 841-44.
406. Id. at 840. Both of these categories are broadly defined. See id.
407. See National Ass'n Ind. Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 502 F.2d 249,
255, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding administrative irregularities). PTAR II was then
abandoned and PTAR III rule making followed. Consideration of the Operation and

Possible Changes in, the Prime Time Access Rule, § 73.658(k) of the Commission's
Rules, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 829-35 (1975).

t

65

-

IOWALAWREVIEW

553

[1980]

also reflect the compromises that occurred. On Sunday, the three networks begin programming at 7:30 p.m. returning to local time at 10:30
p.m. 408 The freeing of a particular one-half hour a week reflects a move
toward greater program flexibility. 40 9 Promotion of public affairs and
informative public programs in this time slot is considered in the public
interest in spite of promotion of such programs being a judgment of program merit, because the promotion is "permissive, not a requirement
and . . . related to only a half-hour a week
.
410
It is, of course, a judgment by the FCC that children's programs
and public affairs programs are worthwhile. 41' Nevertheless, the FCC
did not bar game shows in PTAR II or PTAR III, even though they had
become a bane of PTAR. 412 However, the FCC, after noting that local
programming service had benefited from the rule in prior form, 41 3
stated in uncharacteristically strong language that programming beneficial to the local community or segments of it, whether locally originated or syndicated, was expected either in the time cleared of network
414
programs or in other prime time.
The FCC in its experiment with and reevaluation of PTAR properly seems to have made a major discovery. General rule making coupled with statements of hope are not likely to achieve either the desired
result or any other great change. On the other hand, specific statements
of goals and of the expected results in reasonable rules aimed at attaining such goals should have a more affirmative effect on change and the
achievement of the desired result. The great resistance to the rules indicates a desire to maintain the status quo ante. 41 5 Determinations of what
will occur await an FCC decision to implement the rule when procedural
408. Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the Prime Time
Access Rule, § 73.658(k) of the Commission's Rules, 50 F.C.C.2d 829, 831 (1975). While
the FCC report states that 10:30-11:00 p.m. is cleared time, it is far from universally
true.
409. In PTAR II, the half hour from 7:30-8:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday, was
made the object of the rule, subject to limited exception, with the rule removed on Sundays. See Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the "Prime Time
Access Rule," Section 73.658(k) of the Commission's Rules, 44 F.C.C.2d 1081, 1131-32
(1974). It also permitted the use of one of these six weekly half hours by the network
either for a children's "special" or for public affairs or documentary programs, broadly
defined. Id. at 1133-35. Finally, feature films as well as off-network programs were
barred from the time period for the top fifth markets. Id. at 1135-36.
The choice of change came from a conglomeration of considerations. The 7:00-7:30
period is traditionally "local time" and the networks are not likely to convince their
affiliates to relinquish it. In addition, either sports overruns or special arrangements of
new programs, which created problems with waiver requests that had been unusually
troublesome, nearly always occur in this time period. However, the setting of the 7:308:00 p.m. time conceivably permits feature films or off-network features earlier. See id.
at 1136-38.
410. 50 F.C.C.2d at 841.
411. Id. at 843.
412. Id. at 846.
413. Id. at 852.
414. Id.
415. See id. at 831-35.
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requirements are satisfied. It will depend on whether the FCC will rely
on occasional rhetoric or consistent effective enforcement to implement
its rules and their underlying aims.
G.

Local Service and the Fairness Doctrine
1.

United Church of Christ

The fairness doctrine requires a fair coverage of controversial issues
of public importance. The licensee must seek out these issues and cover
them. While equal time for all sides of issues is not required, the
licensee-of its own initiative-is responsible for addressing all sides of
an issue. The effect of the fairness doctrine, as illustrated by Office of
Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,416 and In re Patsy
Mink (WHAR), 41 7 is that local problems are covered because of a mandate of a rule not directed particularly towards local service. In addition, United Church of Christ illustrated that national programming,
and in that case network programming, may provide service to people in
418
a station's geographic location.
United Church of Christ illustrates an alternative way of approaching local service in a failure to serve the public interest by programming.
Appellant United Church of Christ objected to deletion by the local station of certain network productions. 41 9 Thus, the result of deleting
national network programming was a denial of local service. 420 Relying
on the general public interest standard of the Communications Act, the
United Church of Christ's complaint on behalf of the viewers of WLBT,
Jackson, Mississippi, directly asserted the fairness doctrine by alleging a
lack of balanced local service. 421 The Court of Appeals for the District of
422
Columbia decided the fairness doctrine issue in favor of complainant.
Further, the court of appeals undertook an innovative exploration of
standing and made clear that representatives of the local population
may protest programming on the basis of the general public interest
standard if the programming does not meet the local population's
423
needs.
In United Church of Christ the issue was civil rights. WLBT, a television station licensed to Jackson, Mississippi, consistently presented a
416. 359 F.2d at 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), affid on rehearing, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.
1969).

417. 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
418. 425 F.2d at 544-45, 548.

419. 359 F.2d at 998.
420. Id. at 998-99.
421. Id. at 1000-06; see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,

88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1729-30 (1975) (analysis of United Church of Christ as key in
development of contemporary standing concepts). See also id. at 1723-47 (development
of law of standing into vital aspect of protection of public interest).
422. 359 F.2d at 1000-03, 1006.
423. Id. at 1000-06.
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segregationist view of race relations, violating the fairness doctrine. 424
WLBT overtly refused, under the guise of technical problems, to present national network programs on the subject. 425 The refusal had the
effect of denying blacks, who constituted forty-five percent of the
population in WLBT's primary service area, an opportunity to have
varied views presented on this controversial subject. The population
served by WLBT was denied balanced material provided by a national
outlet on civil rights, a local issue of great importance. Although the
court spoke in terms of the fairness doctrine, the decision's thrust is
broader. Not only is fairness crucial, but service to meet a particular
need for discussion of a local problem deeply affecting the residents of
the service area is also important.
While the proposition that litigants such as television viewers should
have standing to protest a license renewal is now commonplace, 426 the
position was novel when United Church of Christ was decided. 427 In
determining that the appellant public representatives had standing, the
court canvassed the basic concerns related to local service requirements.
The court quoted with approval an earlier FCC study of network practices:
[I]t is the public in individual communities throughout the
length and breadth of of our country who must bear final
responsibility for the quality and adequacy of television service-whether it be originated by local stations or by national
networks. . . Hence, individual citizens and the communities
they compose owe a duty to themselves and their peers to take
an active interest in the scope and quality of television service

which stations and networks provide and which, undoubtedly,
has a vast impact on their lives and the lives of their children
424. Id. at 999, 1000; see Fairness Doctrine Report, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 30 (1974).
425. The station routinely placed "trouble with network transmission" signs before
the camera and stopped network discussion of civil rights. 359 F.2d at 998.
426. Today standing is granted for minimal economic or other harm if arguably protected by the relevant statute. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1976)
(injury to environment does not support standing when no individual interest affected);
Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154-56 (1970)
(data processing services have standing under Bank Service Corporation Act or National

Bank Act); see Fuchs, Prerequis'testo JudicialReview of AdministrativeAgency Action,

51 IND. L.J. 817, 961-79 (1976) (law of standing as developed currently); id. at 979-80
(limits on development of standing); Stewart, The Reformation of American Admin-

istrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1728-30 (1975) (discussing United Church of
Christ). See also id. at 1723-47 (development of "interest" standing).

The broadcast viewer or listener would be protected by the public interest standard of

the Communications Act; and if harmed would be a "person aggrieved" within the
meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).

427. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1167, 1729-30 (1975) (development of contemporary standing concepts). See also
id. at 1723-47 (development of law of standing into vital aspect of protection of public
interest).
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....

[T]heir interest in televisionprogramming is direct ....

They are the owners

. . .

of all broadcasting. 428

The rationale and effect of United Church of Christ on standing, as
well as the FCC's rather consistent, yet unenforced, importation on
viewer's rights, gives "the public in individual communities" the right to
seek redress of what they regard as abuse or omission in programmingIt also illustrates, as do the programs discussed in the NBC case, that
some, if not most, local problems can be met by national service and, by
extrapolation, that most of the goals of the local service programming
requirement can be met either by syndicated or by network national service.
2.

The WHAR Case

Of greater significance than United Church of Christ was the FCC
decision in the WHAR case. 429 Complaints from various national environmental groups led the court to hold that radio station WHAR of
Clarksburg, West Virginia, violated the fairness doctrine by its failure to
adequately cover the biological and environmental aspects of strip mining during consideration of federal legislation on the issue. WHAR carried Associated Press news reports on the general issue of strip mining
without editorial comment, one program that tangentially discussed
strip mining safety, and ABC documentaries, including an Issues and
Answers radio version in which strip mining was discussed. 430 WHAR
could not identify any broadcasts concerning strip mining, but apparently assumed that some existed. 431 The FCC determined that, in
substance, the licensee had failed to cover an issue of public importance
to its community. 432 Service to the community was required by the FCC
under the long established, judicially endorsed, but previously ignored,
fairness doctrine, which required coverage of issues of public impor433
tance by licensees.
The WHAR decision facilitates the use by citizens of the fairness
428. 359 F.2d at 1003 (quoting FCC, TELEVISION NETWORK PROGRAM PROCUREMENT, H.R. REP. No. 281, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1963) (emphasis added by court)).
429. Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
430. Id. at 993-94. The requirement of fairness was originally stated in the Report on
Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1948), and was approved in dicta
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 393 (1969), and Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 111 (1973). The policy was
restated by the FCC in 1974 Fairness Doctrine Report, 48 F.C.C. 1 (1974). Nevertheless,
the WHAR opinion was the first enforcement of the rule. 59 F.C.C.2d at 998 (Robinson,
Comm'r, concurring).
431. 59 F.C.C.2d at 997.
432. Id.
433; Id. at 998. In his concurring statement, Commissioner Robinson correctly
characterizes the FCC's test, although several other adjectives appear in the main opinion. Id. at 995-97.
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doctrine to require local service; it leaves a number of questions open,
however, and raises other issues. An initial matter is the critical question
of what constitutes an issue of sufficient importance to require
coverage. 43 4 Harrison County, where Clarksburg is located, is the area
subject to the most strip mining (measured by surface area) of any West
Virginia county.435 As a manifestation of this fact, the local newspapers
had devoted extensive commentary to the subject, petitions had been
circulated locally, and congressional attention had focused on the matter. 41 6 Accordingly, the FCC held that this was a437critical issue and as
such triggered the fairness doctrine requirement.
The critical issue requirement fails to solve the problem, however,
because one person's critical issue is another's irrelevancy. For example,
strip mining was not listed as a principal need or interest of WHAR's
community in its 1970 renewal application and its 1974 application for a
new FM license. 43 8 Apparently, the licensee found no one who thought
439
Commisthe issue critical, yet in a highly principled concurrence,

sioner Robinson could assert that "it is not merely an issue which is
'critical' or 'burning' but one which all reasonable men must
acknowledge to be such, that triggers this obligation.

'440

This is true

with the caveat that reasonable people may disagree as to when
"reasonable men" must agree. Perhaps it would be better to require that
the issue be demonstrably critical, with a further requirement that
objective demonstration approach the high level 441 of the critical issue in
WHAR.

Two important local service questions remain after WHAR. First,
one must ask what becomes of ascertainment. If the FCC intends to
require the licensee to ascertain and program for local needs, 442 the
failure to comment on this fact, which was raised by petitioner and
recognized implicitly by the Commission in its discussion of sources of
the fairness obligation, is strange. 443 Perhaps such a discussion would
have encumbered the initial FCC statement on the issue coverage aspect
of the fairness doctrine; still, the failure is so blatant and gross that it
requires not only remark, but inquiry. 444 A licensee could miss a critical
issue only by gross negligence, sloppiness, or intention. FCC silence
434. Id. at 995.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 990.
439. Id. at 998-99.
440. Id.
441. See id. at 995.
442. See id. at 996 (citing City of Camden, 13 F.C.C.2d 412 (1969) (principal FCC
decision on congruence of ascertainment and programming)). See also WHEC, Inc., 52
F,C.C.2d 1079, 1081-83 (1975) (principal case on service to place or to people question).
443. See 59 F.C.C.2d at 999 n.2 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring).
444. See id. (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring).
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strongly suggests that the FCC will hesitantly enforce its ascertainment
rules. The extreme disregard of WHAR reflects an apparent attitude
that only marginal compliance with FCC rules is required. The long line
of ascertainment decisions and the failure to effectively enforce the fairness doctrine, exemplified by WHAR, suggests the attitude of WHAR is
widespread and one on which licensees who wish to avoid their obligation can rely.
Second, there is the question of what constitutes local service. The
important answer is that local service is service to the public provided by
the licensee in its soundly exercised discretion.4 4 5 While the FCC's
opinion expressed concern that WHAR did not program locally on the
strip mining issue,4 4 6 the primary concern is that WHAR "delegated" to
the Associated Press and to ABC its duty to program on the subject, 447 a
delegation that is emphasized both by the station's assertion that ABC
provided programming on the subject and by its failure on inquiry to
identify any such programming. 448 The well-placed reliance on an
observation that it is the service that fulfills the need, and not the source
of that service, 4 4 9 properly indicates the course of inquiry the Commission should use to prevent licensees from avoiding the substance of the
rules. Thus considered, the FCC's rules attempt to promote the goal of
local service, although in fact they only marginally promote it. It is,
however, uncertain whether these rules are effective or whether they are
used primarily as make-weights; often they provide facile logic, not hard
reasoning, to determine which applicant will receive a license.
Significantly, the integration of ownership and management is
ranked second among the issues that must be considered in every comparative hearing. 4 0 The criterion for determining who receives a license
at issue in a comparative hearing is supported by the rationale that
management by licensee owners, who bear the ultimate responsibility
for meeting all standards set forth in the Communications Act and by
the FCC, will better assure adherence to the entire scope of standards
than management by employees. Local service is considered enhanced
because the owner-managers must by nature of the position reside in the
community of service. Accordingly, they will be sensitive to local needs
and, since the owner-managers are responsible for meeting all standards
445. See id. at 998 n.1 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring).
446. Id. at 998 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring).
447. See id. at 999 n.3 (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring).
448. Id. at 997.
449. Id. at 996.
450. The comparative issues must be considered when two mutually exclusive applicants for a license meet the minimum statutory and technical requirements. The 1965
Policy Statement sets forth the following issues: (1) diversification of control of the
media; (2) full-time participation in station operation by owners; (3) proposed program
service; (4) past broadcast record; (5) efficient use of frequency; (6) character; and (7)
other factors (including any relevant and substantial factors). 1965 Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings, I F.C.C.2d 393, 395-96 (1965).
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of the Communications Act and of the FCC to retain the license, will be
451
punctillious in doing So.
While owner-managers may be circumspect in fulfilling their programming duties, employee-managers may also perform well. At worst,
the employee-managers will presumably wish to manage well enough to
assure the license is not revoked, which would extinguish their jobs. It is
reasonable to assume that employee-managers will act responsibly and
attempt to further the licensee's interest by good or superior management. Additionally, the employee-managers are probably residents of
their respective community of license and will bring the same knowledge
about the community to the job that the managing owners would
45 2
bring.
Credit given in the comparative hearing is enhanced if the
residences of the owner-managers is local. Local residence is preferred by
the FCC to previous experience in broadcasting when integration of
ownership and management is evaluated. 45 3 Also, the FCC awards a
plus for involvement in local affairs before licensing. 45 4 Here, too, it
seems the policy overstates the obvious while neglecting the reasonable.
No doubt contacts in the community are beneficial. Still, the experienced broadcast executive should have little trouble establishing a
strong knowledge of a new community of employment.
The FCC has attempted to promote and to accommodate local service
in a number of policies. 4 5 As a result, local service has intruded into an
emphasis of those policies. Rather than closely examine each policy for
its potential contribution to both the public interest and local service,
the FCC has maintained its earlier preoccupations. Paradoxically, this
may be beneficial in the future, even though it seemed quixotic over the
past years. While the FCC has hampered some developments such as
cable television, it has totally stifled none, including the possibility of
new technologies supporting multiple television networks.
The intrusion of the commitment to local service into policy deci451. Id. at 396, 402; cf. Jaffe, The WHDH Case: The FCC and Broadcasting
Licensee Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1693, 1696-97 (1969) (criticism of standard).
452. Even if this is not true when first employed, the employee-manager will quickly
become a resident and familiar with the community. The argument that a new resident
is presumptively unfamiliar with the community and unknowledgeable about local issues
was rejected by the Supreme Court as a justification for durational residency as a prerequisite to voter registration. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 356-58 (1972). See
also Simson, A Methodfor Analyzing DiscriminatoryEffects Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 688 (1977) (discussing Dunn v. Blumstein problem).
453. 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcasting Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393,
396 (1965).

454. Id. at 396.
455. The FCC supported H.R. 12993 in the House form. In the 1970 policy statement, Consideration of the Operation of, and Possible Changes in, the Prime Time
Access Rule, § 73.658(k) of the Commission's Rules, 50 F.C.C.2d 2d 829 (1975), such a
standard was omitted. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving

Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 425 (1970).

LOCAL SER VICE CONCEPT

613'

sions has been pronounced. Limiting radio station power to 50,000 watts
results largely from local service views, 4 6 as does the refusal to use
higher powered television stations. Local service commitment likewise
impeded variation on the allocation tables promulgated in 1952 that
would have permitted four viable television networks.
The United States has never used radio stations with a power
greater than 50,000 watts, except for a brief experiment with WLW,
Cincinnati, in the 1930s. 457 In 1945 the FCC instituted proceedings to
determine whether more efficient use of twenty-five clear channels in
the AM broadcast service would best be achieved by adding additional
stations to them, 458 or by permitting the stations then assigned the channels to broadcast at substantially increased power. 459 By 1961 the proceedings were suspended 460 with the decision to permit additional
stations on thirteen channels and to reserve the remaining twelve stations for possible future duplication of service or use with super-power
stations.

46 1

The decision the FCC faced was, and still remains, a difficult one.
A super-power station would provide greater signal coverage at night,
but it presents interference problems. Its signal "blankets" the transmittor area so its programs cannot be received. In addition, its very power
creates problems of cochannel and adjacent channel interference. Nor
is a super-power station clearly superior for providing a first service to
more people, as opposed to an additional service, whether first or of a
lower order. The ground wave of the super-power station is not proportionately greater than a 50,000 watt station, so in this respect doubling
the number of stations may be preferable to increasing power. Likewise,
proper geographic distribution of a second station would provide firstor second-night services to many people, reducing the advantage of a
super-station. Thus, the FCC clear channel problem is difficult and
46 2
complex.
The clear channel problem remains today. The FCC currently is
inclined to finish the task it began in 1961. Duplication of the remaining
clear channels has been proposed and appears likely. The problem has
given rise to a controversy that exemplifies the thesis of this Article. If
456. Clear Channel Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band, 31 F.C.C. 55,

569, 573 (1965).
457. See Crosley Corp. v. FCC, 106 F.2d 835, 833-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 605 (1939).
458. Clear Channel Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band, 31 F.C.C. 565,
568-69 (1961).

459. Id.
460. Id. at 601.

461. Id. at 573. Between the WLW experiment and the 1961 decision, the FCC
elicited contradictory resolutions from the two houses of Congress. Conipare S. REP. No.
294, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) (Senate disapproves over-50,000 watt stations) with H.
REP. No. 714, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (House approves over-50,000 watt stations).
462. See Clear Channel Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band, 31 F.C.C.

565, 572, 600 (1961).
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WSG, Nashville, which broadcasts the Grand Old Opry, were duplicated, geographically dispersed communities would receive added local
service of a significant magnitude.

Communities of country music

devotees would lose their present program. The choice is between places
and people. 463 Would the increment of new geographically determined

service exceed in value the loss of the Grand Old Opry? However
answered, the problem poses the persistent confrontation between local

geographic allocation and an effort to serve people broadly.
III.

TOWARD A REFORM OF THE LOCAL SERVICE OBLIGATION

A.

Legislative Reform and the Local Service Concept

In WHDH, Inc. an incumbent licensee operating on a temporary
license assignment was denied license renewal. The FCC awarded the
license to one of several competing applicants after a comparative hearing; the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. 4 64
The court of appeals applied the 1965 Statement on Comparative Hearings. 465 The FCC relied primarily on the diversification of media ownership, a major factor against the incumbent licensee that also owned the
Boston Herald Traveler, 46 6 and secondarily on the greater integration of
owners into day-to-day management by the successful applicant. 467 The
decision shook the firmly held FCC position that incumbent licensees
should be given a strong, essentially insurmountable preference over
challenging applicants for the frequency assignment at renewal. The
WHDH decision examined the rules for initial grant of license for vacant
frequencies. 468 This could be justified, and the case restricted to its
facts, because WHDH was given an FCC temporary assignment license.
Despite the
possible factual limitation of WHDH, the case reverberated
46 9
widely.
1.

The FCC Response to the WHDH Case

The immediate response to the WHDH decision was an interplay
between Congress and the FCC aimed at mitigating the anxieties of the
463. See BROADCASTING, March 5, 1979, at 98.

464. WHDH, Inc. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 861-63 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
465. 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 4 (1969).
466. See id. at 17-19. Interestingly the Herald-Traveler folded after loss of the
WHDH license, since the television station apparently subsidized the newspaper. The
total impact on service to the community, especially when the importance of continued
network presentation on the WHDH successor is considered, seems negative, even
though the case is an important step forward in legal doctrine.
467. Id. at 13-14.
468. Id. at 2.
469. The decisions in Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp., 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963), and
Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951), were brought into uncertainty even
though not repudiated. See 16 F.C.C.2d at 9. These decisions gave incumbent licensees
a clear preference. See 35 F.C.C. at 678-80; 15 .C.C. at 1175.
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broadcasting industry. Senator Pastore introduced legislation that would
have required a broadcasting license to be renewed absent both a finding that an incumbent licensee had not served the public interest and a
hearing to determine who should be the new licensee. 470 This would
have discouraged challenges to incumbent licensees. The FCC responded
with a Policy Statement471 that would have had the force of rules. The
criterion for license renewal established in the FCC's Policy Statement
was substantial service indicated by meeting the needs and interests of
the licensee's area of license in past programming. 472 If service of this
caliber was not otherwise tarnished by serious deficiencies, the incum473
bent would receive a preference sufficient to result in license renewal.
The Policy Statement was overturned by the Court of Apeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Citizens Communication Center v.
FCC.4 74 The court found that the Policy Statement was substantially
equivalent in effect to the Pastore legislation and thus effectively precluded in a comparative hearing. 475 The court held that under the Communications Act, a comparative hearing must be afforded any applicant
for an incumbent frequency with the license going to the party best
equipped to serve the public interest. 476 The court thereby indicated
477
that "superior performance should be a plus of major significance"
and rejected the FCC Policy Statement view that substantial service
should result in a plus of major significance. 478 The court set forth
general guidelines in both quantitative and qualitative terms for FCC
clarification of the meaning of superior service. 479 The FCC should consider "elimination of excessive and loud advertising and delivery of
quality programs. '480 Moreover, "one test of [this standard] of superior
service should certainly be whether and to what extent the incumbent
has reinvested the profit on his license to the service of the viewing and
listening public." 481 Such a plus would virtually assure renewal. 482
The FCC reaction was to avoid the Citizens Communication Center
decision and to revert to a policy virtually identical to that which pre470. S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
471. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
472. Id. at 425.
473. Id.
474. 447 F.2d 1201, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
475. Id. at 1210. In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 330 (1945), the
Supreme Court held the Communications Act requires a comparative hearing under 47
U.S.C. § 309(a) (1976).
476. 447 F.2d at 1210-13. This language implies that all possible comparative factors
are to be considered.
477. Id. at 1213 (emphasis original).
478. See id. at 1212-14.
479. Id. at 1213 n.35.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 1213.
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dated WHDH.481 Initially, the FCC in its 1971 decision, Moline Television Corp. ,414 insisted that its term "substantial" was the same as the circuit court's term "superior. '4 5 It then proceeded to renew a challenged
license in which the licensee had failed to fulfill its promise as to local
and public service programs and could not meet the "substantial" test as
to news. 4 6 Then in RKO General, Inc. (KHJ-TV)4s7 the FCC accepted
programming that was at best average and disregarded the thrust of the
other comparative criteria and ordered renewal. 488 The FCC avoidance
of WHDH and Citizens Communications Center was clear and com-

plete. No matter how serious the challenge or weak the incumbent, the
incumbent licensee would be preferred. 489 This preference amounted to
an automatic renewal after pro forma hearings and rhetoric following
the court of appeals opinions.
In Central FloridaEnterprises, Inc. v. FCC490 the court of appeals

ended this FCC practice. Central, which sought the license held by
incumbent Cowles Broadcasting, had prevailed on the questions of
diversity, integration of ownership and management, and minority participation. 4 9' Cowles had been found to have improperly located its
studio outside its city of license. 492 On the issue of past performance the
FCC, without support in the record, found Cowles's performance
"substantial" and held that it fulfilled the FCC's "renewal" expectation.4 93 The court of appeals expressed specific dissatisfaction with the
FCC's treatment of diversity of ownership and past performance.4 94 Central prevailed without question on the comparative issue of diversity of
ownership, since Central had no other media interests while Cowles had
extensive media interests elsewhere.49 5 Cowles was allowed to benefit
from a record of past programming, which the FCC failed to demon483. See Geller, The ComparativeRenewal Process in Television: Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REV. 471, 488-89 (1975).
484. 31 F.C.C.2d 263 (1971).
485. See id. at 268-70.
486. Id.
487. 44 F.C.C.2d 123 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515
F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975).
488. See id. at 130-33.
489. See Geller, The ComparativeRenewal Process in Television: Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REv. 471 (1975).
The Commission wanted to avoid decisions . . . denying renewal to a
licensee .... [The FCC] sent a message to the industry and to potential challengers. Even when the licensee had not rendered "superior" or "substantial"
service and even when the challenger compared favorably with him on comparative criteria such as diversification and integration, the licensee would
obtain renewal.
Id. at 496.
490. 44 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 345 (D.C. Cir. 1978), amended on rehearing,44 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1567 (1979).
491. Id. at 354-56, 368.
492. Id. at 362-63.
493. Id. at 359.
494. Id.
495. Id. at 364-65.
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strate was above average.4 96 The court noted that the FCC had an aversion to applying a comparative criteria to challenges to incumbents
except those that favored the incumbent.4 97 The court made clear that
until original applications and renewals were distinguished by the FCC,
a conclusion difficult to support under the Communications Act, both
were governed by the Policy Statement of 1965.498 By abandoning the
Policy Statement the FCC may have violated section 309(e) of the Communications Act.4 99 In particular, the court held that substantial service, however defined, did not "justify renewal more or less without
regard to comparative issues." 50 0 Nor does substantial performance that
is in the average range merit "'a plus of major significance. "'5 01 Rather,
the court held that prior service that is superior or above average war50 2
rants a plus of major significance that will generally result in renewal.
The challenger must then make a clear and strong showing that it is
superior in the comparative criteria in areas in which the incumbent is
5 03

deficient.

These decisions make it clear that the FCC must consider licensee
performance. Pro forma renewals are no longer acceptable. Therefore,
the FCC and Congress should develop comparative criteria for renewal
that will result in programming for the various segments of society.
2.

The Legislative Efforts: The 1974 Proposal

In 1974 Congress nearly succeeded in a modest reform of the current Act. 50 4 Congress emphasized the problems that will be faced in any
legislative reform in a bill that passed the House and Senate in different
forms. The bill illustrates especially the uses and importance of the local
service concept. 505 Congress was apparently motivated by the WHDH
decision and the court of appeals' rejection of the FCC position in
Citizens Communication Center.50 6 Congress proposed to shift the FCC's
focus in challenged renewal applications from diversity of media to
greater emphasis on ascertaining needs and programming for the needs
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.

Id.
Id.
See
See
Id.

at 369-71.
at 360.
id.
id. at 360 n.60.
at 370.

501. Id.
502. Id.
503. See id. at 370-71.
504. See H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
505. The House version of H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1974), and the
Senate version of H.R. 12993, § 5(a), both require ascertainment of local needs. The
Senate version requires problems, needs, and interest to be substantially met. Both
versions of the bill focused primarily on this aspect to achieve change that moved from

the WHOH emphasis on diversification of media ownership and the inferior service standard of CCC.
506. For a discussion of the effect of these decisions on the state of the law, see text
accompanying notes 464-89 supra.
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of the area of service of the licensee.5 °7 The major inquiry in renewal of
broadcast licenses was to be a limited one, based on unexamined criteria
acceptable to licensees, not an inquiry based on criteria the licensee
found distasteful, as in the WHDH or Citizens Communications Center
decisions.5 08 The legislation passed the House and Senate in different
forms. 0 9 While the bills were never reconciled, they had substantial
common ground. Both versions required ascertainment of local needs
and programming to meet the ascertained needs.sl ° Both required the
promulgation of rules before the FCC could consider matters pertaining
to industry structure in individual cases."' Both required the FCC to
determine which broadcast licensee regulations do not serve the public
interest and to report to Congress regarding this process. 51 2 The House
of Representatives would have lengthened terms of license from three to
five years, 13 eliminated consideration of integration of ownership and
management,5 1 4 and required negotiations of some sort between
licensees and the public they serve as trustees.5 1 5 The conference committee was unable to resolve the differences between the houses and did
not report.
Both bills moved from consideration of media ownership, central to
the WHDH holding, to ascertainment of and programming for community needs. In the House version the licensee was to ascertain the
needs, views, and interests of the community throughout the term of the
license. 1 6 The Senate version limited the scope of ascertainment to the
community's problems, needs, and interests. 1 17 The omission of the
community's views is significant, at least insofar as it avoids irreconcilable conflict. Catering to local views might result in substantial bias
and impossible disagreement as to the nature of local views. Assuming
some variation among different places, most localities will have a spectrum of views. 518
507. Diversity was the focal point of WHOH and the 1965 policy statement. The two
bills in § 2(a)(i) made ascertainment of local needs the focal point.
508. Both the diversification of ownership of media view of WHOH and the inferior
service standard of CCC were defeated by a 1974 attempt to amend the Communications
Act, H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(i) (1974).
509. Compare H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (House print) with id. (Senate
print). The two versions were referred to conference committee, which did not report.
510. See H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1974).

511. Id.
512.
513.
514.
515.

Id. § 6 (House print); id. § 3 (Senate print).
Id. § 2(d)(1) (House print).
Id. § 2(b)(2)(B)(ii) (House print).
The section added subsection (j) to § 309 of the Communications Act. The Com-

mission shall prescribe procedures to encourage licensees of broadcasting stations and
persons raising significant issues regarding the operation of such stations to conduct,
during the term of the license for such stations, good faith negotiations to resolve such
issues. Id. § 4. The Senate version placed greater emphasis on ascertainment during the

preceding term.

516. H.R. 12993 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a) (1974).
517. Id. (Senate print).

518. A vivid example is Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 998, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff'd on rehearing, 425 F.2d 543 (1969). No
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Determining the various community interests is another important
step in making licensing decisions. The 1960 Policy Statement gave this
undertaking considerable weight.51 9 By the issuance of the Primer on
Ascertainment in 1971, the FCC policy had shifted its emphasis to programming for problems of the community rather than programming for
interests of the audience. 20 Programming for interests of the audience
remains important, however. Local groups who regard themselves as
excluded from appropriate consideration by licensees in program decisions lodge complaints that focus on neglect of their programming interests.
The thrust of the House and Senate bills was salutary. Diversifica21
tion of media ownership clearly can be dealt with by rule making.
Recognition that a licensee should serve its public is helpful. The House
position on negotiations between the licensees and their local communities was a firm move toward public involvement. Still, both bills and
their legislative history emphasize to excess the idea of local service by
local licensees, rather than emphasizing appropriate service, whatever its
source. The bills would have benefited from an appreciation of the
ubiquitous quality of most "local" needs and possible changes in structures to meet them.
3.

The 1978 and 1979 Legislative Efforts

1978 and 1979 saw the most extensive effort at legislative reform of
broadcast since enactment of Communications Act of 1939.522 While
two Senate bills 523 of a more restricted scope 24 were introduced, the
effort centered on legislation introduced in the House Subcommittee on
Communication of the Commerce Committee. The broadcast provisions
doubt the white citizens' council view in Jackson, Mississippi, in the 1950s and early
1960s favored segregation to the extent of desiring suppression of integrationist views.
This, however, neglected the black view that probably favored integration, although,

given intimidation, the existence of such a view might have been difficult to ascertain.

To identify and follow local views would be extremely difficult and contrary to the

general understanding of the public interest.

519. Report and Policy Statement (Network Programing Inquiry), 44 F.C.C. 2303,
2310 (1960).
520. 27 F.C.C.2d 650, 650, app. B, at 682 (1971).
521. H.R. 12993 § 6(b) (House print) and § 3(b) (Senate print) took this approach, as

did the FCC after its failure. For a history of the FCC effort and its affirmance, see FCC

v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 793-94 (1978).
522. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978).
523. S. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 611, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
This Article is about local service, not the 1978-1979 legislative effort. The examples
are illustrative of the 1978-1979 legislative effort. Unlike the 1974 legislative effort,
which strongly focused on local service, see text accompanying notes 504-21 supra, the

1978-1979 effort retained local service as a key aspect of regulation of television in the

1978-1979 effort, see text accompanying notes 525-43 infra.
524. See WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1404, 1423 n.56
(1979) (H.R. 3333 regarded as providing most deregulation, S. 622 as providing substantial, and S. 611 some, but least of three).
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were finally abandoned in the summer of 1979.525 This in part is due to
the drastic changes in regulation involved. In spite of the broad range of
deregulation, including the specific elimination of requirements of
ascertainment on the theory that good licensees will ascertain local needs
on their own, local service and its traditional core news and public
affairs are returned as licensee obligations. The House bill provides for
the deregulation of radio and the removal of the public interest, convenience, and necessity standard from application to television. 5 26 In other
respects, both bills are similar. For example, both retain for television
an obligation to program for news and public affairs, and locally pro-

duced programs are still required.5 28 Both contain an equity principle
requiring coverage of controversial issues to replace the fairness doctrine 29 and an equal opportunity section for candidates seeking public
office.5 3 0 The requirement for ascertainment is specifically eliminated. 53,
The Communications Regulatory Commission (CRC), rather than the
FCC, would fill the gaps by rules.553 2 The CRC would not have the FCC's
authority to allocate frequencies. 33
The approach to local service in the 1978 legislation is erroneous.
The removal of the ascertainment requirement, justified by assertions
that good licensees will ascertain the programming needs of their community, 3 4 is unsupported. It is contradicted by the format change
cases,53 the fairness doctrine cases,53 6 and the failure of the licensees to

525. See BROADCASTING, July 16, 1979, at 24.
526. Radio is granted an indefinite license with general technical standards. H.R.
3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 471(a) (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 431(a)
(1978). The public interest standard is absent from the bills.
Cable is not regulated by H.R. 13015, but the cablecaster must have permission of the
station or the producer to retransmit a program. H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §
453(a)(2) (1979).
527. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 462(a)(1) (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 434(a)(1) (1978).
528. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 462(a)(1) (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 434(a)(1) (1978).
529. H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 434(a)(2) (1978) provides that the FCC shall
require television broadcasting station licensees to "treat controversial issues of public
2
importance in an equitable manner." H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 462(a)( )
(1979) requires broadcast licensees to "devote a reasonable amount of time to controversial issues of public importance and afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion
of conflicting views on such issues."
530. H.R. 13015 required television to provide equal opportunity for all candidates,
H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 439(a)(1)(A) (1978), but exempted candidates for
President, Vice President, the Senate, or any state-wide office. H.R. 3333 required television stations to provide equal opportunity for any candidate, without exception, for
the office involved, H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 463 (1979).
531. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.

(1978).

532.
Sess. §
533.
Cong.,
534.
Sess. §
535.
536.

See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 211 (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d
211 (1978).
See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 251-252 (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th
2d Sess. §§ 251-252 (1978).
H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 434(b) (1974); H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st
462 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 274-367 supra.
See text accompanying notes 416-55 supra.
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avail themselves of the freedoms provided by the network affiliate
rules. 53 7 Although ascertainment has not been a great success, the cause
lies in the FCC's failure to require programming to meet ascertained
needs. Rather than attempting better implementation, good policy is
rejected because of poor implementation.
The requirement of locally produced programs is also unwise
except for the specific requirement of local news and public affairs.
Audiences need programming that meets the needs, desires, and tastes
of the people in the audience, not locally produced programs that may
or may not meet the viewers' or listeners' needs. Indeed, in many situations syndication, networks, or programs purchased from other sources
will provide superior local service. This gesture to localism is based on
ritualistic acceptance of what has occurred before, but not on reason.
The deregulation proposals likewise are ill-conceived, although
more so in the case of radio than cable. A review of the cases
demonstrates that radio is the focal point of complaint, not television. 38
While excessive plaudits should not be lavished on the television broadcasters, radio fails to a far greater degree to serve the public. 539 The
argument that there are large numbers of radio stations, thus reducing
scarcity, is unavailing. While much constitutional doctrine has been
posited on scarcity,5 40 the Supreme Court has shifted the inquiry in
radio to the pervasive, penetrating nature of radio.5 41 Just as the constitutional basis does not depend on scarcity, likewise abundance does
not assure satisfactory service. This is nowhere better demonstrated than
in the format change cases in which inadequate service has been
challenged by utilizing a doctrine that requires an absence of scarcity to
accommodate the varied formats. 542 Congress should, therefore, reject
the current proposals for radio regulation.
The cable proposals, however, present different issues. FCC cable
rules often have been couched in terms that intend to vindicate local
537. See text accompanying notes 370-91 supra.
538. See, e.g., City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412, 413 (1969); Columbus Broadcasting Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320, 323 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The major broadcaster first
amendment cases, Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), Columbus Broadcasting Coalition, and FCC v. Pacific Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) are
radio cases. These cases have been decided during both the period of the growth of
television and the abundance of radio. While television matters have been litigated, they
constitute a small number of cases involving program content, especially as it relates to
local service.
539. This conclusion flows from the bulk of complaints against radio, see note 538
supra. It also reflects the view of the author drawn from observation of what is occurring
both directly and on the basis of broad survey secondary material.
540. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376, 396 (1969); NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213-16 (1943); Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Federal
Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1932); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v.
Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
541. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
542. See WCWN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 45 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1404, 1406-07
(1979). A common factor of the format change cases, see notes 274-367 supra, was the
existence of multiple stations.
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service concepts. Substantial deregulation should occur in the cable
area, but at this juncture it is not clear that total deregulation is the best
course. Judicial decisions in other areas of broadcasting are removing
the more objectionable FCC restraints. 54 Likewise, prodding legislative
oversight rather than a hard statutory enactment should supplement the
judicial effort in the cable area. To accommodate all branches of
government, the President should appoint commissioners who are not
hostile to cable or overprotective of over-the-air broadcasters. These
steps should achieve the goal of a limited regulatory scheme promoting a
good, growing cable system. Complete deregulation is premature.
The effort to foster the local service concept by legislative reform is
not satisfactory. The 1978 proposal is inadequate and clearly ignores the
main problems of local service while purporting to exalt it. The 1974
proposal was more helpful. It attempted to build on an existing structure that, while unsatisfactory, is acceptable; what is required is
recognition of the actual problems, aggressive FCC rule making and
enforcement, and legislation in the vacuum that will remain.

IV.

A PROPOSED REGULATORY SCHEME FOR SERVICE
TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES

A.

The Theory of Regulation

This Article has demonstrated the inadequacies of both present
FCC policy and current legislative proposals pertaining to the local service goal. Interests of the public and licensee are involved, and first
amendment values permeate both. This interplay of first amendment
interests necessitates a broad, complex solution to local service problems. The essence of local service is to provide service to the individuals
in a location, not merely to serve geographic areas.
In approaching the solution, case law provides valuable guidance.
The first amendment right of the public is paramount and takes
44
precedence over the first amendment right of the broadcaster.
Likewise, the business interest of the broadcaster is subordinate to both
the public's first amendment right 545 and the duty of the broadcaster as
public trustee under the Communications Act.5 46 The definition of
superior service as reinvestment in better service and reduction of adver543. See, e.g., Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1203-05
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (rejecting FCC policy statement granting incumbent licensee controlling advantage); Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d
543, 548-49 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (requiring that FCC "assist in the development of a meaningful record which can serve as the basis for the evaluation of the licensee's performance of [its] duty to serve the public interest"); Miners Broadcasting Serv., Inc. v.
FCC, 349 F.2d 199, 200-02 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (limiting FCC extension of Huntington
Broadcasting standard).
544. See notes 19-43 supra and accompanying text.
545. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
546. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
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tising is instructive of the appropriate relationship. 547 These maxims,
read together, make clear that the FCC has the authority by rule and
course of decisions to require a higher level of program service from its
licensees to the public. The FCC has abjured this opportunity.
The FCC must determine whether the potential improvement in
programming is worth the regulatory effort, impact, and cost. This
Article has established that present efforts to improve programming
through the local service requirement are largely futile and perhaps
counterproductive. The following proposals demonstrate that the
required effort, impact, and cost can be reasonably defined and are
subject to realistic limitations.
The public's first amendment and general public interest rights
must be paramount. Accordingly, licensees should be subject to effective
regulation, and their first amendment rights should be balanced against
and appropriately subordinated to the public right. In addition, some
financial burden, speculative but controllable and subject to amelioration, will be imposed on the licensee. Overemphasis of the possible
impingement on the licensee's interests has effectively excluded other
values, particularly those of the public under the first amendment.
Under these proposals, it is possible that the FCC will be required to
devote more time to the local service obligation problems. This probably
will occur in the early phase of such an effort. It is reasonable to assume
that once standards are set and enforcement is established as the norm,
the FCC probably will expend less resources annually on the problem
than it has in an average year since 1970.
B.

Possible Approaches to the Problem

There are three general approaches to the local service obligation
requirement: maintenance of the status quo, abandonment of present
standards except for geographic distributions, or improvement of the
quality of standards and enforcement. The approaches range on a continuum from no regulation to strict regulation, and each approach has
variants.
Maintenance of the status quo is possible, but one must recognize
and accept its manifest failure to fulfill the goals of local service. The
present approach consists of an occasional episodic assertion by the FCC
of local service standards through agency action or litigation. The FCC's
reliance on pious statements, vague standards, meaningless requirements, and unfettered licensee discretion does little to achieve the local
service goal. Indeed, to a substantial degree, the FCC's approach effectively excludes persons from speaking on behalf of the public, thus insulating the licensee from its public interest obligation.
547. See notes 74-83 supra and accompanying text.
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The status quo could be diluted by relaxing standards and enforcement. The result would be a cumbersome, uncertain system that would
protect licensees and reduce their costs, and the public would remain
without effective vindication of its interests. A modest increase in efforts
to enforce the present standards would have similar, inverse effects.
Moreover, licensee uncertainty and costs would increase along with only
a modest increase in vindication of the public interest. The 1974
legislative effort would have fallen somewhere in this range of better
enforcement, although the FCC's vigor in enforcing the public interest
would be determinative of the amount of uncertainty and increased cost
that would be produced.5 48 Sufficient indolence and bias against strong
standards could have resulted in a less stringent regime of standards.
The important flaw in this approach, then, is its lack of certainty. This
argues for either deregulation or establishment of clear, enforced standards.
The most likely form of deregulation is to abandon any standards
beyond geographic allocation. That is the approach of the 1978 legislation, which proposed deregulation of radio. This approach has several
virtues. It would remove the illusion that the FCC is accomplishing
something or could do so within its present mode of approach. Complete

deregulation makes licensee autonomy the primary value, with the hope
that the public will be served, or more accurately the belief that the
public is best served, by the absence of regulation.5 49 As a result, costs to
all parties would decline. Licensees would have no reason to expend
monies on defense because no grounds for complaint would exist. The
public interest advocates would be frustrated, but they would have
whatever solace is found in clear rules.
Given the clear imperfection of an absence of regulation, the third
alternative of serious regulatory effort must be preferred. However,
two fallacies must first be rejected. First, one must reject the fallacy that
current unrealistic regulatory efforts by the FCC are the best available
alternative. Second, one must reject the fallacy that a regulatory
scheme, unlike a scheme absent regulation, must be essentially perfect.
Any scheme of regulation or deregulation will be flawed. Therefore, the
solution is to strive for the best scheme possible. The nature of the electromagnetic spectrum5' 0 and the pervasive character of radio and
television make some governmental intervention unavoidable. 55 1 With
548. See note 469 supra.

549. See generally Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants,
57 F.C.C.2d 418, 420-39 (1976). This policy choice rests on the initial assumption that

minimal regulations will best vindicate the public interest. The result would be to abandon as many regulations as is lawfully possible and perhaps to legislate for further
deregulation. See also Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C.2d 987, 998

(1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, concurring),

550. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969); NBC
v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211-13, 216-19 (1943).

551. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).
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intervention comes the parcelling of a valuable resource and a usuable
medium.
The results of governmental regulations are economic benefit and
access to the medium for those favored by the allocation. A more complex regulatory scheme is required to redress the unavoidable societal
52
The regulatory scheme
imbalances that regulation initially creates.
should govern not only the traditional forms of radio and television, but
also the new areas of UHF and cable television.
The great power vested in the licensee by the government vis i vis
the public at large must be restrained, while the effective exercise of
first amendment rights by licensees continues. Accordingly, with
establishment of the need for an actual effort at regulation, the
desirability and superiority of regulation is clear. Establishing the' need
for better regulations is only a partial solution to the local service obligation problem. It is next necessary to consider the basis for the new
regulations.
C.

The Need to Increase Broadcast Outlets

The optimum number of sources possible will increase potential
diversity and ensure service to many segments of society. While some
ongoing, direct regulation of program content will be necessary, regulation with the goal of optimum service to the public via multiple broadcast outlets is the means that is least intrusive on program content. For
this purpose, television and radio must be regulated in different ways.
In television the solution is a hybrid scheme of six network over-the-air
systems based on redistributed super-power stations 53 and development
of UHF and satellite technology. One of the six networks should be
public television, since this will be the only over-the-air noncommercial
television service. Significant experimentation with over-the-air service
should be undertaken. With the apparent success of pay cables54 it is
possible that many pay stations and perhaps a new network will emerge.
The development of other technologies of telecasting must be given
serious scrutiny in a comprehensive system of television service. UHF
television technology offers an apparent opportunity to expand the
number of UHF and VHF channels. Satellite transmission offers broad
distribution of present independent UHF stations via cable and the
possibility of establishing another network. Direct-to-home communications and VHF drop-ins could also establish new networks.
552. See Barron, In Defense of "Fairness".A FirstAmendment Rationale For Broadcasting's "Fairness"Doctrine, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 31, 32-33, 41-46 (1964).
553. R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGowAN, supra note 4, at 116-20.
554. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATION POLICY, FINAL REPORT ch.

7,

32-50 (1968). The need to maintain a free service for those who, for one reason or
another, cannot afford cable seems the only argument for over-the-air television. See
note 555 infra.
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The development of alternative technologies should be supplemented by an extensive cable television system. First, there should be
an increase in the number of cable systems. It is clear that an effort to
expand broadcast outlets can succeed, but the effort must be pursued
without exaggerated regard to the effect on current licensees. While the
service and hence the viability of the current licensees is essential, continued oligopolistic profits are not. Second, the cable systems in every
station area should be required to carry over-the-air network systems to
assure them financial viability and to afford them twenty-four hour protection against program duplication. 5 5s Third, the cable system should
be made geographically extensive enough to be viable financially, to
provide reasonable protection to over-the-air broadcasters, and to be
subject to only minimal governmental regulation.5 ,
Additional cable outlets should provide coverage of local matters
not covered by over-the-air broadcasters. If cable outlets do not provide
such coverage, it should be mandated by legislation. Additionally, the
cable system should be permitted to provide pay television, either as an
independent undertaking of the individual cable systems, as part of a
pay cable network, or as a combination of both. Finally, the cable
systems should be required to provide a capacity for both supplemental,
nonbroadcast information services and two-way capacity.557 Given this
structure, which removes the great majority of program control from the
cable systems, concerns with concentration of cable ownership could be
abandoned.55 The control of programs, beyond filling the outline above
with details, could be set aside until it became clear that such control
was needed.5 59
A further aspect of structural modification is a greater emphasis on
public televeison and on cooperative ownership of broadcasting stations.
Both devices offer the potential for substantial improvement of service.
Public broadcasting presently provides programming for many. In addition, it has the potential of providing a yardstick for commercial broadcasters in both public affairs and entertainment directed at particular

groups.
Nevertheless, there are problems inherent in this approach. Public
555. These protections are to protect those who cannot afford cable. The urban poor
cannot afford a subscription fare. Rural viewers will have problems with the adequacy of
cable systems serving them.
556. The importance of minimal governmental regulation of cable television was
demonstrated in Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 440
U.S. 689 (1979). The court in Midwest Video disapproved of the requirement that cable
systems have a public access channel. Id. at 1063.
557. Such service appears to be feasible today. Warner Cable's Cube experiment in
Columbus, Ohio, is a hopeful sign of the potential of such service. BROADCASTING, July
31, 1978, at 27-31. Similar efforts are hopeful in Reading, Pennsylvania. Id. at 31.
558. There remains a concern with antitrust laws. See text accompanying notes
576-85 infra.
559. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392-95 (1969) (suggesting
rules to mandate coverage if fairness doctrine inhibits coverage of controversial issues).
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television has been relegated to UHF, but in the future it should receive
first chance at any available VHF drop-ins. In addition, cable will
facilitate development of broader UHF audiences and hence broader
public television audiences. Moreover, a second or subsequent public
television network could be developed based on cable and satellite
transmissions.
Further problems abound, however. The elitist nature of public
broadcasting narrows the number of people who receive supplemental
benefits from it. This narrowing lessens the usefulness of public broadcasting as a yardstick. Some upward pressure of an elitist nature should
be accepted, but such programming cannot be a sole criterion for public
television. Equally important is financing. Public broadcasting is chronically underfunded, and the quality of public television is diminished
by its clutter of solicitation for funds. Numerous funding proposals have
been made. Revenue from satellites, excise taxes on television set sales, a
licensing tax on television sets, or user fees from spectrum use have been
urged. Limited advertising is also a possibility. A mix of user fee and
excise tax on set sales may be the best solution to public television funding problems. The funding aspect is the most troubling and limiting
part of public television.
Cooperative ownership is a potentially more fruitful area. Congress
endorsed the cooperative concept by establishing a cooperative bank to
lend funds to cooperatives. Cooperatives are likely to be faithful to the
public interests because they are owned by the public at large. Likewise,
they meet the superior service standards of Citizens Communication
Center, since they tend to reinvest their profits in better service. Cooperatives can seek and receive commercial licenses on the same basis as
for-profit licensees, and they should be encouraged to do so.
Radio presents a more difficult problem, although the recommendations on public broadcasting and cooperative ownership apply to
radio as well as television. Technical ability to expand radio sources is
limited.560 Similarly, allocation policies are not as clearly subject to
fruitful modification. The only helpful allocation policy is a continued
effort to improve technology.
The lack of any realistic means of improving the situation by
allocation policy does not end the matter, however. As this Article has
demonstrated, an enormous amount of past and current public
dissatisfaction with service is focused on radio. This is illustrated in the
format change cases, in which all the elements necessary for high quality
service are present. There are profitable licenses, multiple outlets, and
an audience with a demonstrated intense desire for a service. Yet, for560. See Clear Channel Broadcasting in the Standard Broadcast Band, 31 F.C.C.
565, 569 (1961). Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making rejected proposals for AM sta-

tions in cases of 500 watts power. It also proposed to duplicate the remaining AM clear
channels.
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mat changes do not occur. The reasons for this are clear. Profits are
made from advertisers, not from audiences. Usually, audience size, and
sometimes audience make-up, determine advertiser choice. Therefore,
to realize profits, licensees will program for advertisers' interests. 56' This
is so even though the intensity of demand of an unserved interest group
is great, and this group might pay more for the programming. These
cases, from a policy view, show that regulation is necessary if all significant segments of the population are to be served.
In radio, as in television, improved public broadcasting and
cooperative ownership of stations promises improved service. The need
for governmental regulation is greater in the area of radio, however,
because of the advertisers' control over program content.
The foregoing is a sketch of a proposed structural model for achieving local service for persons as residents of places. It will take years to
achieve this model and to solve the problems neither raised nor foreseen.
Accordingly, a more particular response to regulation of program content is required. The FCC generally has failed to suggest or develop a
meaningful standard. Superior service should be defined by the FCC in
both quantitative and qualitative terms, and the requirement of such
service should be enforced.
D.

Intervention in Program Content

The legal basis for intervention in program content is clear. The
Supreme Court in Red Lion established the first amendment interests of
the public, as listeners, as more significant than those of the broadcaster. Having demonstrated that scrutiny of and limited intervention in
programming is desirable, legally mandated, and feasible, a proposal of
a model to implement this desired result is now necessary. Statement of
a proposed model must be general because much crucial information is
either unavailable or effectively so due to lack of compilation. In addition, while a serious and considered effort to cast initial proposals in
practical terms is mandatory, so is flexibility and a recognition of the
limits on foresight. In such a complex area, the administrative virtues of
experimentation, ad hoc responses, and development of policy over time
are indispensible as actual tools. There will be careful policy decisions to
be developed and erroneous policy and technical judgments to be corrected. While attempting a detailed statement of a complete scheme is
not possible, setting forth principles with some precision is.
The fundamental aspects of local service are that it is for people,
that it can be realized by drawing on a variety of sources, that the
nature of the license and the market service are integral to any obligation imposed, and that the program regulation should be general,
561. See Dirlam & Kahn, The Merits of Reserving the Cost-Savingsfrom Domestic
CommunicationsSatellitesfor Support of EducationalTelevision, 77 YALE L.J. 494, 516

(1968).
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especially as to quality and content. Indeed, the regulation should be of
categories and not of content.56 2 There are limits to licensee financial
resources, to the size of the radio spectrum, to the prescience of licensees
and the FCC, and to the Commission's resources. Some critics of regulation may focus on these realities as grave defects. These ultimate practical inadequacies do not, however, justify the present default or the
abandonment of efforts at superior service. Instead, they require that a
superior system be proposed and implemented.
The problem of penalties is a nagging one. Presently the FCC may
issue a cease and desist order 56 3 (sometimes in affirmative form), levy
forfeitures up to $1,000,564 renew broadcasting licenses for a period of
under three years, 56 5 or refuse renewal. 56 6 In appropriate circumstances,
a cease and desist order may be useful. For stations with limited financial resources, the forfeiture is significant, but this causes alarm to a
limited number of licensees. The short renewal causes alarm and leaves
no time for concentrated reflections on conduct. The refusal of renewal
is such a drastic remedy that it is seldom applied.
For medium and large businesses, the penalty structure is one of
harassment buttressed by the faint possibility of revocation of license.
The cost of the harassment may be sufficient to deter or to alter conduct. Clearly, years of letter writing, agency action, and litigation are
not desired by licensees. This approach, however, also may be
undesirable because the public's criticisms are not vindicated. The FCC
seems to accumulate unvindicated charges because of its vague standards and changing community attitudes. The unvindicated charges
may also represent a situation in which the costs of defending and the
reflections caused by possible revocation have focused the licensee's
attention sufficiently on its shortcomings that the FCC imposes no sanction. Thus, the charges are vindicated only to the extent that FCC
harassment causes some change in conduct. 6 7
562. This is the approach of H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 420, 434(1) (1978).
Section 420 forbids censorship or for the CRC to "otherwise regulate content" or to con-

strue the act to so permit. Section 434(1) requires news, public affairs, and locally origi-

nated programs, which is substantially the same approach taken in this Article. More
categories might be required or inquired into, but the inquiry would go to type of programming, not particular content.
563. 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1976).
564. 47 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West Supp. 1979). Each day of violation is subject to the
forfeiture. Id. § 503(b)(2).
565. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1976) permits a broadcast license period of up to three
years, but requires no minimum.
566. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1976) applies to all grants of licenses and renewals. Section
303(m) permits suspension of licenses and § 312 provides for revocation of licenses. Id.
§§ 303(m), 312.
567. This is speculative, but quite possible. It is also a questionable form of justice.

Consider the agonizing of and mea culpa (including over-the-air apologies, promises not

to do it again and some effort to disclaim responsibility) of the Columbia Broadcasting
System over its false assertion that its "Heavyweight Championship of Tennis" was a
winner-take-all event. See, e.g., BROADCASTING, May 8, 1978, at 27; id. Apr. 10, 1978, at
31; id. Mar. 20, 1978, at 25. Notwithstanding the clear misconduct of Columbia Broad-

630
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This has not been sufficient, however. Clearer standards are an
essential first step. Fewer frivolous complaints (probably fewer complaints) or more summary dismissals would result. Harassment costs to
the licensee would decline, and the FCC staff would be less burdened. A
license period of five years 68 would be warranted by better licensee
compliance. Clarity in rules and a longer license term would reduce
licensee compliance cost and release FCC resources. Presumably, compliance would increase with clearer rules and greater resources.
The FCC could then concentrate its resources on those licensees
who faced serious charges of violation of FCC standards or who regularly
disregard or fall short of the standards. Violators should face both larger
forfeitures based on the type of licensee 6 9 and shorter renewals, with the
penalties often combined. The combination would penalize severely the
malfeasant licensee without exacting the ultimate revocation penalty
and would avoid the problem of frequent license changes when redeeming virtues exist in a licensee. It would also reserve license revocation for
the most recalcitrant violator. The cost would thus increase for those
who violate FCC standards.
The effects are the converse for those who comply. A five-year
license period and the advantages of clear standards would decrease
these costs. Even for those wrongly charged, costs would be less because
of quicker, surer dismissals. The result is that inadequate licensees
would be penalized, and better ones rewarded.
E.

Ascertainment

To fulfill the first step, the licensee must ascertain and meet the
needs of its area of service. Initially, the licensees must determine the
demography of its community. This includes general knowledge of the
area and specific knowledge of discrete groups in the community. Then,
5 70
the ascertainment's impact on programming must be determined.
An initial undertaking is to establish policy that causes ascertainment to have an actual effect on programming. The fundamental faccasting System, the use of harassment is unjust. In the Columbia Broadcast System cases,
the FCC has taken the action of renewing one of the network licenses for only one year, a
reasonable sanction. The problem is the next violation of the Columbia Broadcast
System. License revocation will probably not occur, and other sanctions are ineffective.
In all likelihood little will occur.
568. H.R. 12993, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (d)(1) (1974) established five-year terms.
Subsequent legislative proposals give longer periods, followed by an indefinite term. See
H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 471 (1979); H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §
431(a) (1978).
569. Licensees would initially be divided into four categories: VHF television, UHF
television, AM radio, and FM radio. Further divisions would occur on the size of market,
hours of operation, and strength of permitted signal. Penalties for initial violations
should be small. The $1000 per violation limit of 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1976) would be a
useful limit. Thereafter, a forfeiture of up to 10% of projected profit would be a good
benchmark.
570. Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d
418, 460 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
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tors are essential. The licensee must be required to identify programs
that match needs, problems, and interests. 5 7 Ascertainment in any
market should be largely a cooperative effort. There is no reason to
insist on duplicative total surveys by each licensee. In addition,
knowledge of what other licensees are doing might result in meeting
unfulfilled needs. 7 2 The information would provide the basis for particular licensee evaluations by an FCC official without great effort.
Licensee dialogue and agreements with community groups and
with general FCC policy formation can be verified in part by licensee
consultation, which can also assure minimum service and at least limited
agreement on provision of service.5 73 There is no need for a requirement
that every station provide classical music or Spanish language programs,
nor must every licensee serve every member of its service area. Licensees
now identify and meet the needs of their area of service individually.
This policy should continue, 574 but the FCC should also require formal,
direct consultations among licensees, restricted in scope to demographic
determination, and ascertainment of needs for programming guidance.
These consultations should provide a basis for consultation with
57 5
listener/viewer groups.
This approach presents the most difficult legal problem regarding
FCC policy suggested in this Article. While much current licensee action
is consistent with these proposals, it is neither a concerted effort nor one
undertaken pursuant to FCC regulations. This lack of FCC direction
raises serious antitrust problems. Concerted licensee action on program7 6
ming may violate antitrust prohibitions against division of markets.
The issue is whether the FCC can, under the Communications Act,
exempt licensee action, taken under its direction and subject to its
approval, from antitrust prosecution. 577 An exemption from antitrust
regulation may be justified here because the broadcast industry is sub578
ject to governmental regulation.
In United States v. RCA s79 the Supreme Court held that FCC
571. See id. at 432-34.

572. See generally id. app. B, at 445. The licensee should be required to take
cognizance of both community needs and the programming of other licensees. With
possible exceptions for special format stations, the licensee should be required to devote
a specific amount or percentage of time in specific periods to news and public affairs
and public service announcements.
573. This presently occurs in the course of market evaluation. The aim is to formalize
that evaluation properly. See id. app. B, at 426-27, 445.
574. While some services, such as that to women or to large ethnic concentrations in
metropolitan areas, may impose heavy burdens on general format stations, not all service
requirements will. In smaller communities served by few or single licensees, the service

obligation must focus on larger segments of the population, with more specialized services either provided by broad service metropolitan stations or neglected.
575. See Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 57 F.C.C.2d

418, app. B, at 441-46 (1976).
576.
577.
578.
579.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
See generally P. AREDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
179(c).
See id.
358 U.S. 334 (1959).

179(e) (1974).
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approval of a license transfer did not exempt the transfer from antitrust
law. 580 RCA exchanged a television station in Cleveland for one in
Philadelphia. 5 8' FCC approval for the exchange was required by statute
and was granted after the exchange occurred. 58 2 The Court held that
the lack of a pervasive regulatory scheme 8 3 and Congress' refusal to give
the FCC jurisdiction to determine antitrust matters53 4 demonstrated that
the transfer was not exempt from antitrust law. 5
The proposal made in this Article envisions FCC-initiated cooperation aimed at achieving better programming service and therefore differs from the factual situation in RCA. The intent is fulfillment of the
public interest and local service requirements of the Communications
Act. Private initiative is not the source of the conduct, and a private
economic benefit is not the intended result. Instead, the scope of the
concerted activity is limited to undertakings useful in promoting the
public interest through enforcement of the local service obligation. The
proposed station cooperation in fulfilling the ascertained needs of the
community would not affect advertising. Rather, its primary effect
would be on programming that satisfies the needs of various
listener/viewer groups. Given this proposal's limited effect on economic
competition and the clear and immediate promotion of the Commission's statutory mandate, the RCA case can clearly be distinguished. In
this factual context the FCC should adopt a regulation stating that
cooperation in determining and fulfilling ascertained needs is exempt
from antitrust law. In the absence of an FCC rule, the courts should
find an antitrust exemption.
F.

ParticularProgram Standards

Licensees must be reevaluated to determine the extent to which
they can serve the public interest. This evaluation would balance the
licensee's business interest against the public's right to information
under the first amendment. Stations should be classified on the basis of
profit,58 5 and three general categories of service should be established.
They are, in order of importance, 8 7 (1) news, public affairs, and public
service, (2) special entertainment and programming, and (3) general
entertainment and programming. The first category should include
those programs presently so classified by the FCC. The second category
580. Id. at 350-51.
581. Id. at 335-36.
582. Id. at 336-37.
583. Id. at 350.
584. Id. at 346.
585. See id.
586. See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); note 324 supra and accompanying text.
587. This follows current FCC policy in regard to public affairs programs. See note 25

supra.
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should include all programs in a specialized format, as well as all programs that are directed toward significant cultural or ethnic groups and
significant588 groups with special interests, whether those interests arise
5 89
from the nature of the groups, or define the nature of the groups.
The third category would include all other programming. The licensees
would then be required to serve the needs of particular interest groups
within the various categories. Every licensee would be required to justify
in writing, with reference to unserved community needs, any desired
upgrading or downgrading in programming. Likewise, the licensee
could decline to change the lowest apparent classification, if such a
change would not be to its benefit. The licensee classification should be
subject to prospective FCC modification only if there was a showing of
bad faith or a pattern of improper classification. 590
In addition, trade offs between special entertainment and public
affairs should be permitted, especially to encourage special entertainment. These trade offs should occur when a format serves a particular
group, which qualifies programming as special programming. In that
situation the rules should reduce the required amount of public affairs
to a minimum. When it can be shown that a substantial segment of
broadcast time is devoted to such special groups, a proportionate reduction of the time required for public affairs should occur. These elements
of trade off would recognize that there are substantial values for
segments of the community beyond public affairs programming, would
reward those who meet those values, and would reiterate that the public
can be served in a myriad of ways. 591
Based on minimum standards for all licensees and higher expectations for higher potential and actual profitability, minimum percentages
of time should be required for news, public affairs, and public service,
for special entertainment, and for the aggregate of the two. The aggregate amount should exceed the amount of the two combined, without
regard to trade offs. All licensees would be permitted to use the time
generally as they determined, within the two broad ranges.
The licensee should be given further rights for allocation of this
588. What constitutes significance would remain a relative determination. In Stone v.
FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 16% was significant. Id. at 328 n.34. In City of
Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412 (1969), 17% was sufficient to be protected. Id. at 413,418. Factors such as the number of present licensees and other groups of various kinds would bear
on the matter of significant percentage. See id. at 417-18.
589. Mexican ethnic origin with concomitant interest is an example of the first cate-

gory in which the group defines the interest. Classical music is an example of the second

category in which the interest defines the group.
590. Presumably this would occur only when a program fell into special entertainment. No harm would result from a movement away from general entertainment, but a
movement from special entertainment to news might result in falling short of special
entertainment goals.
591. See Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 328 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also notes
275-314 supra and accompanying text (format change cases).
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time. First, it should be permitted to show that the financial circumstances of the licensee require general programming and entertainment. Second, it should be permitted to serve a need of the community
without regard to whether the need is fulfilled in either its programming
or the general programming for the community of service within the
scope of public affairs and special entertainment. Third, although probably not an attractive option, the licensee should be able to use broadcast time in any way, absent a verified complaint concerning lack of
coverage of an area of need in either the licensee's or the general
market's coverage. The third option, however, should result in a rebuttable presumption that superior service had not been demonstrated if a
competing applicant filed for the license. The option is sufficiently
unappealing that it would rarely, if ever, be chosen; still, in the absence
of community demand for better service, the licensee should perhaps
have the option of not providing it and taking the risk that another will
make the offer to provide it.
This Article urges that quantification be adopted, but avoids hard
positions on quantification of requirements that might be imposed.
Accordingly, illustrative suggestions derived from past proposals are
92
advanced. The ten to fifteen percentage proposal for local programs
should be a norm for that portion of the requirement, modified as suggested below. The same amount seems a reasonable norm for special
entertainment. The aggregate of the two, twenty to thirty percent,
would be a reasonable aggregate amount for the two categories. To
accord with the model and to provide some licensee discretion within
the guidelines set forth, a model should be redistributed to about eight
percent public affairs, eight percent special entertainment, and nine
percent interchangeable.
In the case of licensees with a substantial degree of financial difficulty, the aggregate should be reduced to ten percent of which half
should be public affairs and the other half interchangeable. Stations
with modest financial problems and low profitability should be placed
between. Licensees with specialized formats should be permitted to
excise all special entertainment and to reduce public affairs in the form
of news to only three percent. Again, intermediate reductions should be
permitted for partial adoption of a special format.
V.

CONCLUSION

The local service obligation remains largely unexamined, even
592. These figures are drawn from prior proposals and a study of the current situation, but do not reflect synthesis of or access to all information needed for a final proposal, and should, therefore, be treated as illustrative of possible approaches rather than
precise formulations. See Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal
Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 40 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
763, 767-68 (1977); Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 27 F.C.C.2d 580, 587 app.
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LOCAL SER VICE CONCEPT

though it has been central to radio and television regulation from its
beginning. The conflict within the doctrine between the public interest
standard and the licensee interest has been neglected, and the reasons
for local service are little understood. This lack of understanding results
in an exaggerated emphasis on geographic service and a failure to focus
on providing satisfactory service to various groups of people. This situation prevails in spite of the availability of FCC doctrine capable of going
beyond the successful geographic allocation to ensure satisfactory service
for the public. The neglect of the available means, and the proposal to
abandon them for substantial deregulation, is especially lamentable
given the repeated public petitions to the FCC requesting it to mandate
satisfactory service by its licensees. Beyond these failures, the FCC has,
in the name of geographic local service, hampered technologies that
could enhance service to individuals in localities. The FCC ought to
encourage and emphasize these technologies. To remedy the situation
the problem must be confronted by the FCC's power to regulate broadcasting. The FCC must encourage more sources, whenever possible
sources more congenial to the public interest standard than present
licensees are available. The FCC must also promulgate and enforce rules
to prod the recalcitrant licensee to the extent necessary to fulfill the
public interest standard of the Communications Act, while simultaneously
guarding licensee interest. These steps involve a reshaping of communications policy towards the local service concept. If a view based on
the needs of people is placed at the core of the local service concept, it
can be a worthwhile part of FCC policy. If such policy changes are not
implemented, the local service concept will remain a ponderous makeweight justifying FCC decisions.

